I.          BACKGROUND


          Peru has made significant progress in decreasing certain serious human rights violations.  The National Human Rights Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos), in its Report for 1996, states that a total of 292 deaths caused by political violence were on record for the entire year.[1]  Of this total, the armed group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) was responsible for 123 of these deaths, and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement was responsible for an additional three.  Of the 292 killings, 131 were attributed by the National Coordinating Committee to armed confrontations, and only nine killings were directly attributable to the security forces.  According to information provided by the Government of Peru, the capture of the leaders of Shining Path and the MRTA has led to a significant decrease in allegations of human rights violations.  The Attorney General's Office (Fiscalía de la Nación) registered 297 complaints for 1993, 105 in 1994, 54 for 1995, and only 15 for 1996.[2]  Although the Commission does not have the competence under the American Convention to address individual cases alleging violations of rights protected in the Convention which do not involve State responsibility, the Commission has repeatedly condemned the actions of armed groups who employ terrorist tactics in Peru.[3]  In 1996, the Commission expressed its concern over the participation of such groups in Peru.  On December 18, 1996, for example, the Commission severely condemned the taking of hostages and the seizure of the residence of the Japanese Ambassador to Peru.[4]


          Promulgation of the 1993 Constitution has been a positive step toward the reestablishment of democracy and the rule of law in Peru.  Scant progress has been made, however, in restoring the separation of powers among the three branches of government.  In addition, the improper influence of the Executive and military in the judiciary persists.


          Of the criteria set forth at the beginning of this chapter, Peru is included because of the continuing imposition of states of emergency, despite the government declarations and the evidence that the causes that prevailed in the late 1980s and early 1990s have diminished.


          Today one can note significant differences compared to the situation less than a decade ago, when Peru was characterized by hyperinflation, rampant violence generated by warring armed groups, loss of markets and hence foreign exchange, collapse of the internal financial markets, increased dominance of drug trafficking, disintegration of internal social service delivery mechanisms (education, health), and failure of infrastructure (highways, water supply systems, communications, power).


          On April 9, 1995, general elections were held to elect the President and members of Congress.  President Fujimori was reelected for a second five-year term, with 65% of the vote.  The government party also won 67 seats in the unicameral Congress, with 12 opposition parties winning the remaining 53 seats.


          The parliamentary majority enjoyed by the Government made it possible to pass Law Nº 26,479 which, inter alia, grants a general amnesty to military, police, and civilian personnel who were the subject of a complaint, investigation, indictment, trial or conviction, or who were serving prison sentences for human rights violations committed between May 1980 and June 15, 1995, evading the regular procedures for proposing and adopting laws, by preventing public debate on them. The bill had not been publicly announced or debated and was passed soon after it was presented in the early morning hours of June 14, 1995, and signed by President Fujimori the next day.  In order to prevent any judicial review of the Amnesty Law, a second Amnesty Law, Law Nº 26,492, was passed by Congress on June 28, 1995; it prohibits the judiciary from ruling on the legality or applicability of the first amnesty law.[5] 

          II.        THE STATE OF EMERGENCY


          According to the National Human Rights Coordinating Committee report for 1996, approximately 42.1% of the Peruvian population continued to live under a state of emergency, which extended to 18.5% of the national territory.[6]  According to a document submitted to the Commission by the Government of Peru on March 7, 1997, "on the reasons for which the Peruvian State continues to maintain some emergency measures within the framework of the pacification process," 16.15% of the national territory of Peru was under a state of emergency as of year-end 1996.  In 1995, 22.2% of the national territory was under a state of emergency and 48.2% of the population lived in emergency zones, as compared with 25.3% of the territory and 44.2% of the population in 1994, according to the 1995 annual report presented by the National Human Rights Coordinating Committee.[7]   Under a state of emergency, the civilian authorities cede control of specific territories to the Political-Military Command, which is comprised of police and members of the armed forces.  A state of emergency is "decreed in the event of a disturbance of the peace or internal order, a disaster or serious circumstances affecting the life of the Nation.  In such circumstances, the rights connected with personal freedom and security, inviolability of the home, and freedom of assembly and movement may be restricted or suspended.  The state of emergency may not remain in force for more than 60 days, a new decree being required for any extension.  The armed forces assume control of law and order if the President of the Republic so directs." (emphasis added)[8]  The Government of Peru has been extending the state of emergency in various departments throughout the country year after year, even though the Government itself publicly states that the situation giving rise to it has changed substantially.[9] 


          The violence generated by the two major armed groups in Peru, Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which emerged in 1984, has subsided substantially from its high points in the 1988 to 1992 period.  Nonetheless, a serious situation ensued in December 1996, when the MRTA attacked the residence of the Ambassador of Japan in Peru, initially holding hundreds of citizens and dignitaries hostage. By March 1997, as of the approval of this Annual Report, that MRTA was still holding 72 persons hostage.


          Despite the general decrease in violence, both the state of emergency and the anti-terrorist legislation have been maintained and virtually institutionalized.  This legislation was described and analyzed at length by the Commission in the Commission's Annual Report for 1993; it is referred to here for the sake of brevity.


          The Commission observes with concern the extension of the "faceless" tribunals for an additional year.  In another example of the legislation adopted without significant debate early in the morning on October 10, 1996, the Peruvian Congress approved a law extending for one year the life of the "faceless" tribunals for terrorism proceedings, until October 4, 1997.


          Keeping secret the identity of the "faceless" judges and prosecutors prevents them from guaranteeing the independence and impartiality of the courts.  The anonymity of the judges deprives the defendant of the basic guarantees of justice.  He does not know who is judging him or whether that person is qualified to do so.  Thus the defendant is prevented from having a trial by a competent, independent, and impartial court as guaranteed by Article 8 of  the American Convention.  Moreover, proceedings involving terrorism do not allow for recusal of judges or court assistants. Since the purpose of recusal is to guarantee the impartiality of the person who hands down the judicial decision, prevention of its exercise denies the guarantee of a fair trial before an impartial court.



          To keep their identity secret, the norm authorizes the judges not to sign or seal the decisions they issue.  Only codes and keys are used to identify the judges.  For this reason, the institution of "faceless" judges violates another of the guarantees indispensable in a democratic society:  the need to hold public officials liable when they act in violation of the law.  By not knowing the identity of the persons judging them, the defendants are prevented from holding these officials civilly liable.  With all the restrictions mentioned, the principles of criminal due process are in danger of being seriously impaired. 


          The Commission also observes with concern that the courts regularly admit into the proceedings statements obtained through coercive procedures, and that some statements are based exclusively on confessions extracted during police interrogations, through the use of torture.  Article 10 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, to which Peru is a State party, establishes that no statement obtained through torture shall be admissible as evidence in a legal proceeding.  By virtue of this international prohibition, the Commission recommends to the Peruvian judicial authorities that they reject any confessions obtained through torture.


          The Peruvian government has stated publicly that it has effectively dismantled the subversive groups, with the capture of important leaders in various parts of the country,[10] and as a result that "it has become necessary to relax the measures in question."[11]

          On April 21, 1995, as part of the relaxation of these measures, Law Nº 26,447 was published, reestablishing 18 years as the age of criminal liability in cases of terrorism (it had been 15 years); and restored the right of the accused to be assisted by a defense lawyer from the moment of his arrest.  Further, this law eliminated "faceless" tribunals as of October 15, 1995.  Unfortunately, the abolition of "faceless" tribunals did not take place and these tribunals were extended for another year; and, as mentioned above, in October 1996, their abolition was again proposed and defeated, and they were again extended for yet another year.


          Without entirely sharing the government's optimistic assessment, because the facts show that terrorist activity continues, albeit on a diminished scale, the Commission is of the view that not only should the legislation referred to be lifted, but that it should be fully brought into line with the standards set by the American Convention.


          In its 1993 Annual Report, the Commission stated that "civilians tried in military courts are being denied their right to be heard by an independent and impartial judge, a right required under Article 8(1) of the Convention.  It is the job of the Armed Forces to combat the terrorists by engaging the irregular armed groups militarily, as is their primary role in the campaign against subversion.  The Commission is of the view that the armed forces, however, overstep their natural role when they prosecute civilians accused of belonging to subversive groups, as this function is in the proper purview of regular criminal justice."[12]  


          The Commission understands that despite the reduction in political violence in Peru, serious threats continue to exist, as they have at different moments in different countries in the hemisphere.  The Commission believes, however, that respect for human rights is totally compatible with a strong policy against terrorism.  The Convention describes the regime applicable to extreme situations, and the measures that should be adopted within the framework of international human rights law.  The methods and mechanisms used by the Peruvian State go beyond that which is permitted by this framework.  In its struggle against terrorism, Peru has shown tolerance by its senior authorities for the use of torture during police investigations.  In addition, the system of "faceless" tribunals has denied individuals accused of terrorism or treason the right to be tried by an impartial, independent court, as well as denying them the right to defend themselves and the right to due process, and has transformed the judicial process into a summary procedure for sentencing persons who are presumed guilty before they enter the system.  This policy of tolerating human rights violations achieved its counterpart in the form of Amnesty Law Nº 26,479, which prevents the investigation, prosecution and punishment of state agents responsible for crimes against humanity.


          The Government of Peru has informed the Commission that the Attorney General's Office (Fiscalía Especial de Derechos Humanos) has set up the National Register of Detainees, which is intended to prevent arbitrary arrest, the forced disappearance of persons, torture and extrajudicial executions.[13]  The 1996 Report of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances notes that "although the number of disappearances in Peru has decreased, cases reportedly still occur and the National Registry of Detainees is said to be ineffective in preventing such disappearances."[14]  It provides a computerized program to monitor arrests made by the security forces; although originally designed to register persons detained for the crime of terrorism, it is a public data registration system on all detainees.




          The Commission continues to observe with concern that certain provisions contained in the antiterrorist legislation have been given constitutional rank.  In this fashion, certain restrictions on fundamental rights have become permanent.  These provisions include Article 140 of the Constitution of Peru,[15] which extends the death penalty to the crimes of  treason and terrorism, for which it was not applied previously; Article 173 of the same instrument, which transfers jurisdiction of the civil tribunals in cases of terrorism and treason to the military tribunals; and, finally, Articles 2.24(f) and (g), which allow 15 days of police detention incommunicado.  These reforms are incompatible with the obligations freely assumed by the Peruvian State contained in the American Convention.


          IV.       THE AMNESTY LAWS


          A.         The first amnesty law: Law Nº 26,479


          In April 1992, General Rodolfo Robles Espinoza publicly denounced the existence of a "death squad" organized by the National Intelligence Service (SIN) of Peru, called the "Colina" Group.  It was responsible for capturing and executing persons on a preestablished list of presumed terrorists.


          According to the statement made by General Robles, the members of the Colina Group had been responsible for the illegal detention and subsequent extrajudicial execution of a professor and nine students from the University of La Cantuta, which occurred on July 17, 1992 (the "Cantuta" case), and for the "Barrio Altos" massacre, which occurred in November 1991.  General Robles revealed the names of the military personnel who constituted this "death squad" and indicated that the Commander General of the Army, General Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos, and presidential advisor Vladimiro Montecinos, were involved in these events as accessories after the fact and as intellectual authors.


          The testimony provided by General Robles enabled the Peruvian judicial authorities to try and convict important members of the Peruvian Armed Forces in the "La Cantuta" case and to identify and prosecute the individuals presumed responsible for the massacre that had taken place in "Barrios Altos."  The judicial investigations in the Barrios Altos case were moving toward the trial of high-ranking military officers, including Major Santiago Martín Rivas and Major General Julio Salazar Monroe, Chief of the National Intelligence Service, and also noncommissioned officers Nelson Carbajal García, Juan José Sosa Saavedra, and Hugo Corral Goycochea, convicted for the events at "La Cantuta."


          Unexpectedly, early in the morning of June 16, 1995, the Peruvian Congress promulgated the Amnesty Law, Law Nº 26,479, which "grants amnesty to military, police, and civilian personnel who have been accused, investigated and indicted upon occasion or as a consequence of the struggle against terrorism since May 1980."


          Under this law, the few public officials responsible for enforcing the law who had been convicted of torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions were released.  The Commission considers that a serious and impartial investigation is precisely the most effective means to establish the innocence of people who may have been unjustly accused.


          In the case of the Barrios Altos massacre, Judge Antonia Sacquicuray decided to continue the judicial process, considering the amnesty unconstitutional and so inapplicable.


          B.  The second amnesty law:  Law Nº 26,492


          Judge Sacquicuray's decision led to the promulgation of a new law, Law Nº 26,492, which prohibits judges from making a "judicial interpretation" of the amnesty's scope.


          The Commission believes that a law that prohibits judges from interpreting the law is an act infringing on the legitimate powers of the judiciary.  The judiciary is responsible for reviewing the arbitrary or unconstitutional acts of the other branches of government.  When one branch of government, in this case the legislature, obstructs one of the legitimate activities of the judiciary (such as interpreting the law), it is violating judicial independence and illegally forcing the courts to apply unconstitutional laws.


          The Peruvian State has the obligation to ensure for its people free exercise of their basic rights and the right to allow the domestic mechanisms for protecting such rights to function adequately, pursuant to Article 25 of the American Convention.


          C.  Scope of application


          The Amnesty Law has benefitted all members of the Armed Forces and the police who may be investigated, accused, or convicted of human rights violations.  Article 1 is broad and ambiguous, granting amnesty to anyone who is being tried or has been convicted.  According to Article 1, the benefit covers all military, police, and civilian officials, whether they have been arraigned, investigated, tried, indicted, or convicted, before a regular or special court for common or military crimes for any event, stemming from or originating on the occasion of or as a consequence of the struggle against terrorism, and that may have been committed individually or by a group, from May 1980 to June 14, 1995.


          Article 3 of the law provides for the immediate release of all persons deprived of their freedom, whether they were arrested, detained, in prison, or in confinement. 

          The law interpreting the Amnesty Law not only fails to provide an effective remedy, but goes much further, denying any possibility of appeal or of bringing an objection based on human rights violations, as it states that the law applies even to those violations that have not been the subject of allegations. 


          Some of the crimes covered by the amnesty, including acts of torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions, have been considered an affront to the conscience of the hemisphere and are crimes against humanity.[16]




          The Office of the Ombudsman was established by the 1993 Constitution.  Articles 161 and 162 of the Constitution provide that this is an autonomous body.   It is responsible for safeguarding the constitutional and fundamental rights of the individual and the community, and for supervising the State administration's performance of its duties and the provision of public services.  The Human Rights Ombudsman may initiate legislation and propose measures to improve the performance of the State's duties. The IACHR values the creation of this important office and believes that it has great potential to contribute to the improvement of the human rights situation in Peru.


          The Human Rights Ombudsman was appointed by the Congress in March 1996; in view of the problem of persons tried and convicted for terrorism and treason, he began to study the problem and the various bills submitted to the Congress, in order to propose a formula that might win unanimous backing.  On August 1, 1996, President Fujimori endorsed the bill proposed by the Ombudsman, and forwarded it to the Congress.  The bill provided for the creation of an Ad hoc Commission for the purpose of evaluating cases and recommending pardons to the President.  The bill win the unanimous support of the Committee on Human Rights and Pacification, and of the plenary of the Congress; it was unanimously adopted on August 15, 1996.[17] 


          Law Nº 26,655 created the Ad hoc Commission, whose mission, as noted above, is to evaluate cases and recommend pardons to the President when it can reasonably presume that the individual indicted or convicted of terrorism or treason actually had no connection to terrorist organizations or activities.


          On September 11, 1996, the Technical Secretariat notified public opinion as to the procedures for presenting petitions to the Commission.  On December 7, 1996, the Commission agreed to recommend presidential pardons in 110 cases, and the President pardoned 104 persons and granted special executive pardon to six.[18]


          As a result of the events in the Residence of the Ambassador of Japan in Peru, the Ad hoc Commission stopped meeting for a period of three weeks.  Then its meetings were scheduled at long intervals.  Nonetheless, the Technical Secretariat continued to receive requests and continued with its work of evaluating and classifying cases, with the support of the judicial and penitentiary authorities.


          The Technical Secretariat sent several missions outside of Lima to meet with prisoners convicted of terrorism in prisons in the North and South of Peru.  The Secretariat also visited the Castro and Chorrillos prisons in Lima in order to interview those who submitted their cases for review.


          The Ad hoc Commission and the Technical Secretariat have also taken up the subjects of prison conditions in the maximum security prisons and the antiterrorist legislation, especially as regards the "faceless" judges and the military tribunals. 


          Of a total of 3,876 individuals incarcerated in Peru for crimes of terrorism or treason, 1,774 have submitted requests for review to the Ad hoc Commission.[19]   To date, the Commission has reviewed only one-fourth that number.  The Commission's mandate can be expected to be extended through 1997 to allow it to complete its mission.


          Of the 110 persons who have been pardoned, 15 served less than one year in prison, 11 served 1 to 2 years, 14 served 2 to 3 years, 36 served 3 to 4 years, 24 served 4 to 5 years, and 10 served 5 years or more.




          The Constitutional Court was made a part of Peru's legal system by the 1979 Constitution, although it was called the Court of Constitutional Guarantees at that time.  After the break with the constitutional order on April 5, 1992, the Constitutional Court was shut down and the cases that were pending before were not resolved.


          Articles 201 through 204 of the 1993 Constitution restored the Constitutional Court.  Its principal function is to serve as a court of constitutional review.  An autonomous and independent agency, it is made up of seven members who are elected for five-year terms by Congress, by vote of two-thirds of the legal number of its members.  The Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of legislative and executive branches and reviews rulings involving human rights (amparo and habeas corpus).


          The Commission notes with special interest the resumption of operations of the Constitutional Court, given the role this institution can play in strengthening democracy and human rights.  Yet the Commission is concerned that the laws regulating the Court's operations tend to weaken its powers and its competency to declare laws unconstitutional.  By law, a vote by six of the Court's seven members is required for a finding of unconstitutionality, practically nullifying the review power granted to it.


          In the decision creating the Judicial Coordination Council (Law Nº 26,623), even though some of the most controversial provisions of the law had been declared unconstitutional, five of the seven members voted to find all of the transitory provisions unconstitutional as well; consequently, the necessary majority was not attained, thereby frustrating the annulment of articles that are clearly unconstitutional.  It should be noted that the law creates an overarching state authority, above the highest-level judicial bodies, allowing for the blatant interference of the Executive in the administration of justice and judicial reform.  Some prior decisions also attest to the impossibility of constitutional review under a system that establishes virtual unanimity to find a law unconstitutional. 




          The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in the judgment handed down January 19, 1995, declared, inter alia, that "Peru has violated the right to life recognized in Article 4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Víctor Neira-Alegría, Edgar Zenteno-Escobar and William Zenteno-Escobar." (Operative paragraph 1) 


          In the same judgment the Court decided "that Peru is obliged to pay fair compensation to the next of kin of the victims on the occasion of the proceedings and to reimburse the expenditures that they have incurred in their petitions before the national authorities" and "that the form and extent of the compensation and the reimbursement of the expenditures shall be determined by Peru and the Commission, by mutual agreement, within a term of six months as of the date of notification of this judgment." (Operative paragraphs 3 and 4)


          Pursuant to the decision of the Court, on February 14, 1995, the Commission directed a communication to the Government of Peru to set, by mutual agreement with the representatives of the IACHR, the amount of compensation and expenses referred to in the judgment of the Honorable Court.


          Due to the lack of a response by the Peruvian State, no negotiation was possible, which constituted a very serious additional injury to the victims' relatives.


          Consequently, on July 21, 1995, the Commission addressed the Court to request that, pursuant to the provisions of Article 47 of the Regulations, as well as operative paragraph 5 of the judgment of January 19, 1995, it begin the procedure for the Court to determine the amount of the compensation and the expenses that the Peruvian State is to pay to the victims' relatives.


          In a judgment of September 19, 1996, the Court set "total compensation due the relatives of the [three] victims in the case at $154,040.74."


          Instead of complying with the judgment of the Court, on January 6, 1997, the Peruvian State, once the term of 90 days provided for by Article 67 of the American Convention for seeking clarification of the judgment had lapsed, requested "the interpretation of the judgment on reparations" issued by the Court on September 19, 1996, and reported on September 20, 1996.


          The Court denied the request for interpretation on grounds of lateness.  As of the date of approval of this Report, the Peruvian State has not complied with the Court's judgment; its non-compliance continues to pose a serious problem to the victims' relatives.




          1.       The Commission recommends that the entirety of the anti-terrorist legislation and the regulations consistent with it be brought into line with the American Convention.  In this connection, Article 27 of the American Convention, which regulates situations of emergency as regards the absolute respect for those rights that are non-derogable, and the guarantees essential to protect such rights, should meet with full compliance. 


          a)  The Commission recommends that the "faceless" courts be replaced by regular criminal courts that offer the accused the minimal guarantees required by due process and the right to defense.


          b)       The Commission recommends that the Peruvian State adopt legislative or other measures to eradicate the practice of torture and the practice of admitting evidence obtained under torture.


          2.       The Commission recommends that Article 140, 173, and 2.24(g) and (f) of the Constitution be amended to bring them into line with the provisions, inter alia, established at Articles 4, 7, and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights.


          3.       The Commission recommends ending solitary confinement for persons declared to be guilty of terrorism and treason, as well as a review of prison conditions generally, for this group of inmates.


          4.       The Commission recommends that the Peruvian State define the conduct it wishes to criminalize as terrorism, detailing the specific forms of conduct that may constitute terrorism, so as to not extend legal incriminations by analogy, and to make it possible for the accused to exercise the right to defense provided for in Article 8 of the American Convention.  The definition of a type of criminal offense based on mere suspicion or association shifts the burden of proof, violates the fundamental presumption of innocence of the accused, and should be eliminated.


          5.  The Commission considers that there have been major strides in the protection of human rights in Peru, not only because of the major reduction in the type and number of violations, but also in the creation of the post of Human Rights Ombudsman, and the National Registry of Detainees.  As regards the Ad hoc Commission, which the Ombudsman chairs, the Commission takes note of the Government's authentic purpose in respect of reviewing the convictions of those who were unjustly convicted of crimes of terrorism and treason and the release, to date, of 110 individuals who have been pardoned under this procedure.  The Commission recommends that any record of their convictions be expurgated from their personal or police records.


          6.       The Commission recommends that the Peruvian State repeal the amnesty law (Nº 26,479), and the law on judicial interpretation (Nº 26,492), because they are incompatible with the American Convention, and investigate, try, and punish the state agents accused of human rights violations, especially violations that amount to international crimes.


          7.  The Commission recommends that the Peruvian authorities take measures to prevent reprisals against human rights defenders and to protect witnesses and lawyers for the victims in order to guarantee the right to justice and effective legal protection.

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     [1] Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Informe sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en el Perú en 1996 (exists only in Spanish), at 54.

     [2] "Avances en Derechos Humanos en el Perú: 1995-1996," submitted by the Permanent Mission of Peru to the Organization of American States on February 24, 1997.

     [3] The member states of the OAS have not given the Commission jurisdiction to investigate terrorism and subversion, but rather only acts attributable to States.  It is not the Commission's role to replace the State in investigating and punishing violations committed by individuals other than State agents or entities.   The fundamental reason for international bodies to protect human rights, as in the case of the IACHR, lies in the need to have means of recourse when human rights have been violated by state agents or organs.  This doctrine of the Commission was first set forth in the Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49, doc. 19, April 11, 1980) and reproduced in the Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53, doc. 22, June 30, 1981).

     [4] See, Press Communiqué Nº 21/96 of December 18, 1996, elsewhere in this Annual Report.

     [5] In cases related to Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, the Commission has held that as a matter of principle amnesty laws are incompatible with the American Convention, because the Convention imposes on the states the obligation to prevent, investigate, and punish all violations of human rights guaranteed by the Convention, and because an amnesty law tends to undercut the state's competence to carry out this obligation.  See Report 28/92, Cases 10,147, 10,181, 10,240, 10,262, 10,309, and 10,311 (Argentina), Report 29/62, Cases 10,029, 10,036, 10,145, 10,305, 10,372, 10,373, 10,374, and 10,375 (Uruguay) in the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1992-1993; Report 34/96, Cases 11,228, 11,229, 11,231, and 11,282 (Chile); Report 36/96, Case 10,843 (Chile), in the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1996.

     [6] See  National Human Rights Coordinating Committee, Informe sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en el Perú en 1996, at 63.

     [7]  Id.  See Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Informe sobre la Situacion de los Derechos Humanos en el Perú en 1995.

     [8]   United Nations, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Initial reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant,  Addendum, PERU, E/;1990/5/Add.29, 17 June 1996 at para. 150.

     [9] See Speech by the President of the Republic of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, at the Protocolary Session of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (February 3, 1997). "The OAS understood fully that Peru was in an emergency situation [in 1992]."  "In Peru, beginning in 1992, we began to dismantle terrorism.  Dismantle means, in this case, breaking the organization, its structure, eliminating its overall capability, as an operational unit, as an apparatus or machinery.  It cannot be denied that this has occurred."

     [10] According to the Government of Peru, "The capture of the supreme head of the Sendero Luminoso movement together with a great number of the leading cadres of the terrorist organization was carried out on the basis of professional and clear-cut intelligence work by the police forces in clear demonstration of how law and order can checkmate the negative forces that wish to destroy the country.  From 12 September 1992 until the present day, progress in the arrest and trial of terrorist has been made and the majority of the leaders both of the Sendero Luminoso and of the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) movements have been condemned to life imprisonment, while the arduous task is continuing of arresting and putting on trial those implicated in subversive activities, as well as carrying out wide publicity for the law on repentant terrorists, with good results."  United Nations, ICCPR, Third Periodical Reports of States Parties due in 1993, Addendum, PERU, CCPR/C/83/Add.1, March 21, 1995 at para. 180.

     [11] United Nations, "Initial reports submitted," (supra) note 8 at para. 173.

     [12]  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1993 at 507.

     [13] Source, Avances en Derechos Humanos en el Peru 1995-1996, (supra) note 2.

     [14] United Nations, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, E/CN.4/1997/34, December 13, 1996 at para. 278.

     [15] Article 140 of the new Peruvian Constitution:  "The death penalty may be applied only for the crime of treason in the case of war and terrorism in accordance with the laws and treaties to which Peru is a bound party."

     [16] Res. AG/RES. 666 (XII-O/83).

     [17] The inevitable consequence of creating a system that presumes guilt and almost completely rules out the possibility of defending oneself is that a large number of innocent persons are convicted.  Since 1993, the National Coordinating Committee for Human Rights has waged a campaign for the release of persons unjustly detained, tried, and convicted.  No one can say precisely how many innocent people have been convicted, or spent long months or years detained pending a determination as to their legal status.  The Coordinadora reported that it had rendered legal assistance to a total of 1,390 people unjustly accused since 1992, of whom 607 were still in prison as of December 1995.  As the Coordinadora has emphasized, this figure reflects only a small part of the total number of innocent persons convicted and sentenced to 20 to 30 years in prison, or given life sentences.   

     [18] The first group of three was pardoned on October 1, 1996; the second group of 28 was pardoned on October 4, 1996; the third group of 14 was pardoned on October 19, 1996; the fourth group of 17 was pardoned on October 29, 1996; the fifth group of 12 was pardoned on November 13, 1996; and the sixth group of 36 was pardoned on December 7, 1996.

     [19] Of that total, 3,112 have been convicted of terrorism and 764 have been convicted of treason.  Of the first group, 1,274 requests were presented to have the terrorism convictions reviewed, and 500 requests were presented to have the treason convictions reviewed.  To date, 104 have been pardoned for crimes of terrorism and six have been granted special executive pardon (derecho a gracia) for treason.  Of the total 3,876 persons incarcerated, 3,372 are men and 504 are women; of the 1,774 who have requested review, 1,420 are men and 354 are women; and of the 110 who have been pardoned, 77 are men and 33 are women.