7. Forced Displacement and Recruitment of Minors
233. State agents are responsible for a portion of the massive forced
displacement of persons which occurs in Colombia each year as a result of violence. In
addition, the Colombian public security forces have continued to recruit and permit the
enrollment of children to serve in the Military Forces. The Commission will discuss these
problems in Chapters VI and XIII, which specifically deal with issues relating to forced
displacement and children.
F. VIOLENCE CARRIED OUT BY PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
1. Applicable Legal Norms
234. It is understood in Colombia that, because of their increasingly
direct and sustained participation in the hostilities, certain paramilitary groups,
particularly those linked to the Castaño and Carranza families, must be considered
parties to the internal armed conflict in Colombia.( 130
) International humanitarian law thus applies for the purpose of assessing their actions.
In addition, to the extent that these groups act as State agents or proxies, or their
illicit acts are acquiesced in, condoned, or tolerated by the State, their actions may be
attributable to the State and engage the State's international responsibility for
violations of the American Convention and other applicable human rights instruments.( 131 )
235. As the Commission has explained, the Commission's central role is
to address violations of human rights law norms which entail State responsibility. The
Commission therefore believes it necessary to analyze the relation between the
paramilitaries and the State in order to determine to what extent, and under what
circumstances, there exists State responsibility for violations of human rights in
connection with actions undertaken by the paramilitaries.
2. Relation between the State and the Paramilitary
Organizations
236. The Commission must conclude that the State has played an
important role in the development of the paramilitary groups and has not adequately
combated those groups. The State is thus responsible, in a global sense, for the existence
of the paramilitaries and therefore faces responsibility for the actions carried out by
those groups.
237. As was noted in Chapter I of this report, the State allowed the
paramilitaries to act with legal protection and legitimacy in the 1970s and 1980s. State
officials supported the growth of the paramilitaries as a means of fighting the armed
dissident groups. The State eventually was forced to prohibit the creation of paramilitary
groups, because these groups had become powerful and violent allies of those engaged in
the drug trade. However, even when the paramilitary groups became illegal in the late
1980s, the State did little to dismantle the structure which it had created and
encouraged, particularly when these groups carried out counter-insurgency activities.
238. In fact, some sectors have suggested that the resurgence of
paramilitary activity in the last several years took place with the approval or even
assistance of the State's security forces. It has been suggested that the Military Forces
recognized that they could avoid the political costs of engaging in war without limits by
leaving to the paramilitary groups the tasks which violated human rights and international
humanitarian law and which would attract the attention of the public and the international
community. Thus, the paramilitary groups began perpetrating prohibited acts on behalf of
or as auxiliaries to the Military Forces and increasingly became independent forces which,
in some sense, have replaced the State's security forces and carry out their own war
against the armed dissident groups. This view of the development of the paramilitaries is
supported by the statistics which show that, over the last several years, the number of
violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed by the paramilitaries have
increased significantly while the number of violations directly attributable to the
Military Forces have decreased at a similar rate.
239. Until recently, the State's public security forces had entered
into combat only on extremely rare occasions with paramilitary groups and had carried out
almost no detentions of members of paramilitary groups. Even when the Office of the
Prosecutor General began to issue arrest warrants, these warrants were not executed. The
identity and whereabouts of many paramilitary leaders were public, yet no arrests took
place. In this connection, even the Prosecutor General of the Nation, Alfonso
Gómez, has
denounced the complacency of some sectors of the population towards the paramilitaries and
has stated that some low and mid-level military officials "tolerate" these
groups.( 132 )
240. Offers of award money for the arrest of paramilitaries were
announced at the end of 199, including for the capture of well-known paramilitary leader
Carlos Castaño. However, no follow-up of the announcement ever occurred. Numerous
representatives of the media and governmental authorities knew where to find Carlos
Castaño to carry out interviews and meetings with him, yet the bodies responsible for
carrying out the arrest warrant against him were unable or unwilling to do so. During the
Commission's on-site visit to Colombia in December of 1997, the Prosecutor General of the
Nation announced that his office had issued 180 arrest warrants against paramilitary
leaders. Yet, no arrests had taken place. Similarly, the Human Rights Unit of the Office
of the Prosecutor General of the Nation provided the Commission with a list of outstanding
arrest warrants against members of paramilitary organizations during the Commission's
on-site visit. According to that information, the Human Rights Unit alone had issued 115
arrest warrants, yet none of the individuals named in those warrants had been arrested.
Those paramilitary members named by the Human Rights Unit included individuals who had
already been convicted, as well as suspects and individuals officially accused.
241. After paramilitary groups perpetrated numerous horrifying
massacres in the latter part of 1997, which received widespread publicity and several of
which coincided with the Commission's on-site visit, the Colombian State was prompted to
take more aggressive action against the paramilitaries. On December 1, 1997, the
Government announced a plan to combat the paramilitaries. The plan included new
announcements of award money for the capture of paramilitary leaders and the creation of a
specialized search force ("bloque de búsqueda") to facilitate captures.( 133 )
242. Since that time, the State has begun to offer some tangible
results in the fight against the paramilitaries. On December 2, 1997, the day after
President Samper announced new measures to fight paramilitaries, a judge in Bogotá
convicted Arnulfo Castillo Agudelo, a known paramilitary leader in the Meta Department. On
December 10, 1997, the National Tribunal issued a decision sentencing Iván Roberto Duque
to 13 years of prison. The press called the decision the first conviction of a
paramilitary ideologue.
243. On February 24, 1998, agents of the Technical Corps for
Investigations (Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación - "CTI") of the Office of the
Prosecutor General of the Nation captured Victor Carranza Niño. Victor Carranza is a
well-known emerald mine owner who has been accused for years by many sectors of being the
primary patron of the paramilitary groups which act in the eastern plains and in the
Department of Boyacá. Despite the numerous accusations against him, Victor Carranza had
never been prosecuted previously. He had been arrested on one prior occasion in September
of 1990. He was released the following day, because there was no arrest warrant pending
against him.
244. In addition, according to the XVII Brigade, its Army units killed
five alleged members of paramilitary groups in combat in Urabá in January of 1998. On
February 12, 1998, police forces in Antioquia exchanged fire with a paramilitary leader
from the Dabeiba region of Antioquia. The paramilitary leader, Edwin Alvarez Cano, was
killed in the incident. According to persons from the area, Alvarez had served in an
important position in the ACCU. Subsequently, on March 1, 1998, the Army captured 12
alleged paramilitary members in the Magdalena Medio region in an operation carried out in
Cimitarra, Department of Santander.
245. According to recent statistics provided to the Commission by the
Colombian Government, the Military Forces, the National Police and DAS, between January
and May of 1998, captured a total of 139 paramilitary group members and killed in combat
22 members of those groups.( 134 ) These statistics
provide some reassurance regarding the determination of the Colombian State to eliminate
violent paramilitary groups. However, the Commission notes that the statistical report
also shows that, during the same time period, the State's security forces killed 254
members of armed dissident groups and captured 436 members of those groups. In addition,
the same packet of materials provided to the Commission by the Colombian State includes a
letter from the Human Rights Unit of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Nation.
The letter, dated May 11, 1998, indicates that the specialized search force created by
President Samper had not yet carried out any of the arrest warrants issued by that Unit
against members of paramilitary groups.
246. In January of 1999 the State announced yet another plan with a new
strategy for combating paramilitary groups. This announcement roughly coincided with
published reports attributing responsibility to paramilitary groups for multiple horrific
massacres that resulted in the death of nearly 140 people. The proposed strategy provides
for a coordinated effort to gather intelligence information useful in the task of
disarming the command and financial structure of paramilitary groups, together with the
intensification of military and police operations. The plan aims at achieving concrete
results within pre-established time limits. The Commission hopes that this announcement
signals the serious determination of the State to take all necessary measures, concertedly
and at all levels, to confront and terminate the illegal activities of these irregular
groups. The Commission must express its disappointment with the attitude adopted by the
State in the fight against paramilitary groups, particularly during the process of their
emergence and strengthening. After an initial period during which it failed to take any
action whatsoever to suffocate the emerging irregular groups, the State started
progressively to make some late efforts. Such efforts, however, have not translated into a
proportional response to the growth of the phenomena and, as confirmed by recent events,
they have not been adequate in the least.
247. The Commission nonetheless considers recent measures to combat the
paramilitaries to be of utmost importance and will continue to observe with great interest
the steps taken by the Colombian State in this regard. The Commission recognizes that
dismantling the paramilitaries in Colombia is not an easy or a quick task. These groups
have, in many cases, become very independent from the State which originally promoted them
and have become extremely strong and powerful in their own right. Some of the groups have
developed into well-armed and well-trained military style units. These groups will not
easily cede to the wishes of the State even if the State has finally taken a firm decision
to abolish them.
248. The Commission also acknowledges that the State's international
obligations generally are ones of means rather than results. In other words, the State
must take all appropriate measures to dismantle the paramilitaries and halt their abuses.
Where a State takes all such measures and does not obtain the desired result of
eliminating the paramilitary groups, in principle that State does not face international
responsibility. Nonetheless, the Commission is of the view that the Colombian State bears
a very high burden of showing that it has adopted all necessary measures and that it acts
with full conviction in combating the paramilitaries, given the State's role in allowing
these groups to achieve the strength that they possess today. In the Commission's opinion,
the State has not yet met that burden.
249. Even as the State has expressed increased interest in combating
the paramilitaries over the last several years, the Commission has continued to receive
information regarding cooperation between paramilitary groups and the State's public
security forces. This information calls into question the State's commitment to
eliminating the paramilitaries. In addition, the Commission reiterates that, in all cases
where paramilitaries act as proxies of State agents or with the cooperation or
acquiescence of those agents, the State becomes internationally responsible for the abuses
which they commit. The international responsibility of the State for the human rights
abuses committed is not diminished by the fact that the State has enunciated a general
policy against the paramilitaries. The Commission will thus proceed to analyze the
information which it has received regarding the relation which has existed between the
State's security forces and paramilitary groups in Colombia.
250. The Commission has received information which indicates that, in
certain areas of the country, there exists a high degree of collaboration between the Army
and paramilitary groups. The Commission has received testimony and information to the
effect that, in some cases, members of the Army and the paramilitaries carry out joint
operations. In some cases, members of both armed groups actually patrol together. In
others, soldiers enter an area first and warn the population that the paramilitaries are
coming behind them. The paramilitaries then commit acts of violence against those who do
not follow instructions.
251. During its visit to Urabá, the Commission received testimony
regarding such joint operations. Many individuals told the Commission that, at the
beginning of 1997, the Army had appeared in the small communities near San José de
Apartadó to announce to the residents that they must leave the area. The soldiers warned
that, if residents did not follow these instructions, the paramilitaries would follow and
would attack those who remained. Within a short period, the paramilitaries began to carry
out extrajudicial executions in the area, forcing most of the residents to flee their
homes to find refuge in San José de Apartadó, Apartadó and other areas.
252. The Commission received specific information concerning the death
of Miguel Angel Graciano, resident of the small community of Salto de
Apartadó, in such a
joint operation executed in March of 1997. According to several witnesses, Mr. Graciano
was captured along with Bernardo Moreno Londoño by a joint patrol of paramilitary members
and soldiers. The patrollers told the two captured individuals that their group included
40 paramilitary members and 80 soldiers. The patrol then removed the captives to two
different areas. Mr. Moreno was subsequently released by the soldiers who held him. Mr.
Graciano was apparently left with the paramilitary members. His dead body, displaying
signs of torture, was found a short time later.
253. The Commission must assume that, in these cases of joint activity,
the commander of the local military base, battalion or brigade has knowledge of the
cooperation between his soldiers and the paramilitaries, although such knowledge is
denied. Thus, for example, General Rito Alejo del Río, who at the time of the
Commission's visit served as Commander of the XVII Brigade, with jurisdiction over the San
José de Apartadó area, denied any connection between the soldiers under his jurisdiction
and the paramilitaries in the area. However, the Commission received information which
made this denial implausible.
254. For example, the Commission specifically asked General Rito Alejo
del Río about the existence of a paramilitary roadblock in the road between Apartadó and
San José de Apartadó. Representatives of the Colombian State, diplomatic missions and
non-governmental entities alike had provided detailed information to the Commission about
this roadblock. However, General Alejo del Río denied the existence of any paramilitary
roadblock.
255. During its visit, the Commission received testimony regarding the
Army's knowledge about the roadblock. Local authorities informed the Commission that, on
March 2, 1997, a delegation of Government authorities, including representatives of the
Office of the Prosecutor, the Police and the Army, was halted by the paramilitaries at the
usual roadblock. The delegation sought to reach San José de Apartadó to inspect and
remove the cadavers of Miguel Angel Layos Castañeda, Rubén Antonio Villa Rivera and
Rubén Antonio Villa Alvarez, who were killed there on February 28, 1997. The individuals
who had installed the roadblock announced that all was well and that they were members of
self-defense groups and that the delegation could carry on. A soldier responded amicably
calling out to the paramilitary members as "cousins."
256. Given this level of interaction between paramilitary forces and
Army troops within his jurisdiction, the Commission considers that, barring extreme
ineffectiveness and lack of control over his troops, General Rito Alejo del Río must have
had knowledge not only of the roadblock but also generally of the presence of
paramilitaries in the area and the cooperation between those groups and his troops. This
conclusion is corroborated by the findings of several special commissions, composed of
governmental and non-governmental organizations, which operated in the region during 1995
and 1996. One of these commissions found that military and paramilitary units had
developed lists of persons in the area which showed a high level of collaboration between
the regular and irregular forces. The commission's report found that these lists were
utilized as a means of control in roadblocks set up by the groups around the region.( 135 ) Another commission reported that the
relationship between State security forces and paramilitary groups in the area was open
and notorious. That commission found that members of the Army often went to paramilitary
bases and even carried out training sessions there, while other local security forces were
known to play pool with the paramilitaries.( 136 )
257. Yet, despite numerous complaints about the collaboration between
the Army and paramilitaries in the jurisdiction of the XVII Brigade and the manifest
seriousness of the situation, the Army never investigated General Rito Alejo del Río's
conduct in this regard. In fact, the Ministry of Defense recently transferred him to the
important post of Commander of the XIII Brigade, which includes Bogotá in its
jurisdiction. In addition, official army propaganda from the Army General Command made
favorable reference in 1997 to the "pacification" of the Urabá region. Based on
this information, the Commission considers that the Colombian State should investigate the
degree to which knowledge regarding joint activities between members of the Army and
paramilitaries may also have reached high levels of the Army. In August of 1998, civilian
prosecutors finally opened a preliminary investigation into General Rito Alejo del Río's
activities in Urabá.
258. The Commission notes that, in these cases of joint activity
between the military and paramilitaries, particularly when carried out with knowledge by
superiors, the members of the paramilitary groups clearly act as State agents. The
Commission must therefore judge their actions by human rights law as well as by
humanitarian law norms, and the violations which they commit will be attributable to the
State.
259. The information analyzed by the Commission suggests that, in other
cases and areas of the country, members of the military and the paramilitary have strong
connections which do not involve joint operations. These ties with the paramilitaries may
exist at different levels of the Military Forces. These connections often permit the
State's security forces to request that the paramilitaries execute certain tasks and the
paramilitaries may, in turn, demand from the Military Forces the right to undertake
criminal activity with impunity.
260. For many years, organizations and individuals in the Department of
Meta have denounced such ties between high-level Army officials at the Seventh Brigade in
Villavicencio and the paramilitaries connected with the Carranza family. For example,
Josué Giraldo, President of the Human Rights Committee for Meta, denounced such links
before he was killed. Shortly before his execution, Mr. Giraldo had noticed that he was
frequently followed by vehicles belonging to the Seventh Brigade. His death on October 13,
1996 was presumably at the hands of the paramilitaries. Based on this type of information,
the Commission has repeatedly asked the State to investigate and remove those officials at
the Seventh Brigade who have connections to paramilitary groups. The State has not yet
taken any steps in this regard.
261. In February of 1998, the State found sufficient information
establishing the existence of these types of connections between paramilitaries and
members of the State's security forces in Bolívar to arrest four Police and Army
officials. The Office of the Prosecutor General of the Nation ordered the arrests which
were executed against the second commander of the Army's Junín Battalion and three
commanders for the Police of Bolívar. The Office of the Prosecutor General is
investigating these officials for allegedly working with known paramilitary leader Carlos
Castaño to coordinate paramilitary groups. The Army and the Police, respectively, removed
the suspects from their positions and detained them upon petition by the Office of the
Prosecutor General.
262. In these cases of cooperation between elements of the military and
the paramilitaries, the Commission also finds that the members of the paramilitary groups
are, in effect, State agents. These persons act with the cooperation and support of State
agents and often receive information about possible targets from members of the State's
security forces. They also receive protection from these State agents against
investigation and sanction. The persons whom they act against with violence or threats
generally understand that the paramilitaries enjoy special strength and authority derived
from their collaboration with the State. The members of these paramilitary groups thus
effectively act under color of official authority. Their actions must therefore be judged
by the standards set forth in human rights law as well as humanitarian law. When they
violate human rights and humanitarian law norms, the State will bear international
responsibility for those violations.
263. The Commission has also received information indicating that State
entities and agents sometimes acquiesce in the actions of paramilitary groups where more
active participation does not take place. The case of the massacre of Mapiripán provides
an example of a case where, at a minimum, the paramilitaries involved benefited from the
acquiescence of State security forces. Over the course of six days between July 14 and 20,
1997, at least 100 heavily armed members of the ACCU paramilitary group seized control of
Mapiripán, a small coca-growing town in the Meta Department in southeastern Colombia. The
ACCU members tortured, killed or disappeared approximately 30 villagers. Carlos
Castaño,
the leader of the ACCU, readily admitted responsibility for the massacre. He suggested
that the villagers all deserved their fate because of their ties to armed dissident groups
and announced that he would coordinate many more such massacres.
264. Many organizations and even State officials have found significant
evidence that the State could have but did not stop this massacre. The evidence suggests
that the State's failure to act was so blatant that it suggests clear acquiescence in the
events, if not more.
265. In June of 1997, paramilitary organizations announced, in their
third conference, that they would plan incursions into southern Colombia. Yet, the State
took no action to show that it took these announcements seriously. Nor did the State's
public security forces take any action to prevent the movement of paramilitary troops to
the site of the massacre. Days before the massacre, Carlos Castaño transported his men to
the area by plane. There exists a record of a private plane with capacity for 60 persons
departing from Los Cedros, Urabá for San José del Guaviare three days before the
massacre. Yet, there is no record of their arrival at the airfield in San José del
Guaviare, which is heavily guarded by the Colombian Army. Upon arrival by plane in
southern Colombia, the paramilitary members then proceeded through an area of the country
with heavy Army presence to the site of the massacre without any difficulty. The municipal
judge for Mapiripán, Iván Cortés Novoa, began calling to the Joaquín París Battalion,
the nearest military base, for immediate assistance on the first day of the paramilitary
occupation. He called for assistance a total of eight times. Yet, the Army battalion did
not arrive until July 20, the last day of the killing spree. Several Army officials from
the Joaquín París Battalion have been detained in relation to the investigation of the
massacre.
266. In other cases and areas of the country, the information provided
to the Commission indicates that State agents are responsible for omissions which permit
the paramilitary groups to carry out their acts of violence. The Commission received
numerous complaints indicating that Police and Army units stood by as paramilitary groups
entered towns to intimidate the population, carry out extrajudicial executions and take
cattle and other goods from the population. Many complaints also allege that, in
populations with paramilitary presence, the identity of members of the paramilitary groups
is well-known. Yet, State authorities do not attempt to carry out arrests against these
individuals.
267. Incidents in early 1998 in the Department of Putumayo may provide
an example of omissions of State agents in relation to paramilitary violence. On February
12, 1998, local civil and religious authorities began to denounce killings by
paramilitaries in the area around Puerto Asís, Department of Putumayo. Representatives of
the Catholic church and persons fleeing the area stated that a large group of
paramilitaries had entered the region during the last days of January and had begun
carrying out selective executions. The mayor of Puerto Asís, Néstor Hernández
Iglesias,
fled from the area and confirmed the statements regarding the paramilitary incursion. He
stated that 45 persons had been killed. Others, including the local Office of the Human
Rights Ombudsman and local government liaisons ("personeros") placed the number
of victims between 30 and 50.
268. At their third conference, referenced above, the paramilitary
organizations had also made known their plan to enter Putumayo. In addition, Carlos
Castaño confirmed the existence of plans to carry out activities in Putumayo in
interviews that he held with the press.( 137 ) Yet,
as with Mapiripán, the State apparently did not take measures to prevent the paramilitary
incursion.
269. After information became public regarding the killings in Putumayo, high-level State officials publicly refused to accept the veracity of the
information or to take special measures to investigate the incidents with a view to
prosecuting those responsible. National Police Director, General Rosso José Serrano,
denied knowledge of the killings in Puerto Asís and said that communist agitators were
spreading misinformation. The Ministry of Defense issued a press release indicating that
it had received information from local Police, military and prosecutors which contradicted
the announcements of the killings. They further denied the need to send in the special
search force ("bloque de búsqueda"). Defense officials suggested that the
deaths might be part of the normal death rate in the area.
270. Because the killings did not occur in a single massacre, officials
were able to suggest that a paramilitary incursion had not taken place. Yet, even Police
statistics soon showed that the violent death rate in the first two months of 1998 had
experienced a dramatic increase in comparison with first two months of the previous two
years. Also, the testimony of numerous civil authorities and displaced persons indicate
that the killings were carried out in a highly selective manner, not characteristic of
common crime, by armed men with lists of alleged guerrilla sympathizers. These men
sometimes identified themselves as members of paramilitary groups and painted walls with
paramilitary slogans. Also, when judicial authorities began to carry out some
investigations into the crimes, they received written threats from self-identified
paramilitary groups who accused the authorities of bias in investigations against the
paramilitaries and in favor of armed dissident groups. Several of those officials had to
be transferred out of the area. The Commission considers that State agents thus incurred
in grave omissions in response to information made known in the first months of 1988
regarding serious violations by paramilitary groups. When local government officials
denounced new paramilitary killings in Putumayo in August and September 1998, the Army
finally arrested ten persons alleged to be members of a paramilitary organization.( 138 ) At the same time, the Army criticized the local
authorities for denouncing the killings.
271. The Commission notes that, in many cases, it might be suggested
that acts of acquiescence and omission constitute evidence of more direct State
involvement. However, even where State agents do not directly participate in paramilitary
acts of violence, the State may become responsible for the violations committed by those
groups. The State becomes internationally responsible for harm caused to individual rights
by private actors when it acquiesces in the acts of those private actors or when it fails
to take reasonable measures to prevent the violation or, subsequently, to investigate and
sanction those responsible for the harm caused.
272. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Commission concludes
that the Colombian State bears international responsibility under human rights law, as
well as international humanitarian law, for a significant number of the acts of violence
committed by paramilitary groups in Colombia. The Commission will proceed to describe the
violations committed by those paramilitary groups.
3. Statistical Information Regarding Violations of the Right
to Life and Forced Disappearances
273. Most sources agree that paramilitary groups have been responsible,
over the last several years, for the greatest number of forced disappearances and
violations of the right to life in Colombia. According to statistics provided by various
organizations, the percentage of responsibility for killings attributable to paramilitary
groups have risen steadily over the last several years to approximately 60% of all deaths
and disappearances, where the authorship is known, carried out for socio-political
reasons, outside of combat-related activities. In 1995, paramilitary groups killed or
disappeared approximately 452 individuals outside of combat, while the total number of
individuals killed as a result of socio-political violence not directly related to combat,
where the author was identified, was 982.( 139 ) In
1996, paramilitary groups killed or disappeared approximately 751 individuals outside of
combat while the total number of individuals killed as a result of socio-political
violence not directly related to combat, where the author was identified, was 1,198.( 140 ) In 1997, paramilitary groups were responsible
for approximately 1,152 socio-political killings outside of combat.( 141 )
274. In the case of the paramilitaries, these statistics probably
provide a relatively clear view of the number of violations of international law
committed. According to the information provided to the Commission, almost all of the
violent actions carried out by the paramilitaries are directed against civilians. The
violent actions of the paramilitaries are aimed at obtaining greater socio-economic and
political control over territory and populations. The paramilitaries still engage only
infrequently in direct armed confrontations. Where they do so, detailed information
regarding injuries and deaths occurring in combat is scarce and would not likely be
reflected in the statistics. Because paramilitaries generally attack members of the
civilian population who are not directly participating in the hostilities, almost all acts
of violence attributable to paramilitary groups constitute violations of international
humanitarian law and, in those cases involving State responsibility, human rights law.( 142 )
4. Massacres
275. The Commission has received information indicating that
paramilitary groups commit numerous massacres of the civilian population each year.
According to statistics provided to the Commission, paramilitary groups committed 16 of
the 48 massacres carried out in 1995.( 143 )
Paramilitary groups were responsible for a significant increase in the overall number of
massacres since 1995. Paramilitary groups were allegedly responsible for 84% of the 185
massacres committed in 1997 with social and political motivation.( 144 )
276. The massacres described above, in Mapiripán and Putumayo, are two
examples of the type of mass killings carried out by the paramilitaries. Upon the
Commission's arrival in Colombia in December of 1997, the press, non-governmental
organizations and civil society were focused on recent massacres in the Departments of
Antioquia, Cundinamarca and Cesar.
277. Between October 25 and November 3, 1997, paramilitaries entered El Aro, in the municipality of
Ituango, Antioquia. The paramilitaries rounded up the
population in the main plaza and announced that they should abandon the area. After
carrying out the massacre of approximately 15 persons, members of the paramilitary groups
burned down numerous structures in the community, including approximately 40 homes. Army
officials allegedly remained on the periphery of the town during the paramilitary
operation, even turning back villagers who attempted to flee. Witnesses from the area
stated that, during their several-day stay in El Aro, members of the paramilitary group
stole cattle. They then passed through the center of the nearby community of Valdivia to
take the cattle out. According to these witnesses, when the paramilitaries herded the
cattle through the center of Valdivia, representatives of the Army fired shots so that the
residents would remain in their homes, allowing the paramilitaries to pass through without
difficulty. Residents of El Aro stated that the October, 1997 attack on the town had been
preceded by an incident the previous year in which members of paramilitaries entered the
community with members of the Colombian Army. According to information provided by the
National Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman
for Medellín, only three families remained in the town after the October, 1997 attack.( 145 )
278. The leader of the ACCU, Carlos Castaño, acknowledged the
responsibility of his group for the massacre in El Aro, arguing that it was an important
strategic gain, because armed dissident groups plan and launch attacks from this area.
Carlos Castaño announced that he sought control over the area known as the "Nudo de
Paramillo" by December. The Nudo de Paramillo is located in northern Antioquia and
borders on areas presumably owned by the Castaño family. This area also serves as an
entrance into the combative Urabá region of Antioquia.
279. After Castaño's announcement, his paramilitary groups proceeded
to perpetrate additional massacres of civilians to achieve the control sought. In
November, the ACCU attacked the small towns in the municipality of Dabeiba, also in the
Paramillo. In Dabeiba, the groups killed at least 16 persons, burned homes and forced 600
peasants to flee the area. Residents of Dabeiba later announced that armed men had first
arrived on July 20 to threaten the community, stating that its residents were guerrilla
collaborators. After Dabeiba, the ACCU advanced to the area known as Peque. In the first
community which the paramilitaries entered in Peque, they killed four persons and burned
down the local school, provoking the mass displacement of almost 1,500 persons. Despite
the public announcements by the ACCU regarding their intent to secure these areas, the
State's public security forces took no preventive actions to halt these attacks.
280. Similarly, on November 21, 1997, paramilitary groups killed 14
peasants in La Horqueta, Department of Cundinamarca. On November 27, 1997, seven peasants
in Ciénaga, Department of Magdalena were killed by paramilitaries. Also, during the
Commission's visit itself, between December 1 and 2, paramilitary groups entered three
communities in southern Cesar and killed eight persons.
281. These and other massacres committed shortly before the
Commission's visit are but a few of the numerous massacres authored by paramilitary
groups. The paramilitaries have also carried out several well-known and horrifying
massacres in Segovia, Department of Antioquia.
282. For example, on April 22, 1996, a paramilitary group entered
Segovia at approximately 8:30 p.m. The commander of the local Bombona Battalion of the
Colombian Army, Captain Rodrigo Cañas, purportedly provided for the transportation of the
paramilitaries to Segovia. The group entered a billiard hall and fired automatic weapons
at its patrons. This action resulted in seven deaths and injury to eight other persons,
one of whom subsequently died while receiving medical attention. The paramilitary group
proceeded to enter the El Tigrillo neighborhood. Its members threw two grenades at another
billiard hall and shot at those inside. Two persons died at the scene and three more were
killed while receiving medical attention. Seven other individuals received injuries. The
paramilitary group then left the town by the main highway. During their presence in the
town, the paramilitaries passed by the Police station in the main plaza and by military
posts. Yet, they had no difficulty in carrying out their acts and then leaving the town
without the slightest interference or resistance by these State agents. The Army acquitted
local military commander, Captain Cañas, of any wrongdoing. However, the Office of the
Prosecutor General of the Nation did bring charges against Captain Cañas for homicide and
the formation of paramilitary groups.
283. Significantly, paramilitary groups carried out a similar massacre
in Segovia in November of 1988, resulting in the death of 43 individuals, including three
children. Residents of the area have always suggested that the Military Forces were
involved in that massacre. The Colombian justice system recently convicted five Army
officials for their involvement with the paramilitaries in the planning and execution of
the massacre.
284. During its on-site visit, the Commission received significant oral
and written testimony regarding massacres committed by paramilitary groups in the
municipality of San Roque, Department of Antioquia. The municipality of San Roque includes
the towns of San Roque, Cristales and San José del Nus and other even smaller
communities. Armed dissident groups had a strong presence in this area over the last
decade and, through violence and intimidation, had managed to obtain a significant degree
of control over the mentioned communities.
285. Residents of this area have informed the Commission that
paramilitary groups entered the area on June 17, 1996, making their presence known first
in San José del Nus. They then entered the community of Diluvio where they gathered the
residents together, identified themselves as a self-defense group and threatened to
"finish off" all those who sold supplies or provided transportation in public
buses to members of armed dissident groups. With a list in hand, they went to the home of
a local merchant, Alfonso Zuleta. They took Mr. Zuleta out of his home, tied his hands and
then shot him. The paramilitaries announced that this was just a lesson and that they
would return to "clean the area." They took three other merchants with them out
of the community. The lifeless bodies of these other three victims were found later that
day. The army entered the area the following day and began entering and inspecting homes,
suggesting that members of armed dissident groups were allegedly in the area.
286. The same paramilitary group again entered the area again, on
September 14, 1996, killing five more persons. One of the victims, Carlos Valencia
Osorio,
managed the local sugar mill. The paramilitaries tortured Mr. Valencia before killing him,
because he gave them sugar. The paramilitaries argued that, if he gave sugar to them, he
must also certainly have given sugar to armed dissidents. On this occasion as previously,
the members of the paramilitary group wore military-style clothing and moved from
community to community without any difficulty, despite the presence of Army and civilian
authorities in the area.
287. The commander of the Fourteenth Brigade at the time of the events,
Colonel Carlos Enrique Vargas Forero, stated publicly that the situation in San Roque and
Cristales was completely normal and that the presence of armed dissident groups created
the only public order problem in the area. Members of the community informed the
Commission that it is common knowledge that the paramilitaries have remained present in
the area and have set up a post on the road leading out of Cristales. Yet, no authorities
have made any effort to arrest them. The Commission mentioned the complaints regarding the
area of San Roque and Cristales to then Governor of Antioquia, Alvaro Uribe
Vélez.
Governor Uribe responded by simply stating that armed dissident groups had been present in
the area for years and nobody had complained, apparently implying that the paramilitary
attacks were deserved or necessary or somehow not worthy of attention.
288. The paramilitaries have also made good on their promise to commit
additional massacres similar to that in Mapiripán. On May 4, 1998, members of the ACCU
paramilitary group entered into Puerto Alvira, a village of about 1,200 inhabitants in the
municipality of Mapiripán. List in hand, members of the paramilitary group
extrajudicially executed approximately 21 persons. The victims included a four-year-old
girl. Some of the victims' bodies were drenched with gasoline and burned. The paramilitary
group warned the residents of Puerto Alvira that they would suffer further attacks if they
did not leave the town in eight days, causing the exodus of most of the villagers.
Apparently the Colombian Military Forces and other authorities had again failed to take
any steps to prevent this massacre despite Carlos Castaño's warning after Mapiripán that
further massacres would take place in the area.
289. As the Commission noted above, the right to life remains protected
even in time of armed conflicts. Paramilitary massacres of civilians constitute grave
violations of international humanitarian law. In addition, where paramilitary groups carry
out massacres with the collaboration, support or acquiescence of State agents, they also
constitute grave violations of the right to life, under human rights law, and result in
State responsibility for those violations. The Commission expresses its most serious
condemnation of the numerous horrible massacres committed by paramilitary groups in
Colombia.
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(
131 ) The
Commission wishes to emphasize that treating paramilitary groups as parties to the
internal armed conflict in Colombia does not give them special status or recognition. This
treatment means only that they are bound by the norms of international humanitarian law.
Common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions explicitly provides that the application of the
laws of war in no way changes the legal status of the parties to the conflict. By
referencing international humanitarian law in analyzing the acts of paramilitary groups in
Colombia, the Commission does not entail recognition of political or legal status for
these groups.
(
132 ) See
"Fiscal colombiano denuncia complacencia con paramilitares", El Universal,
Caracas, Venezuela, January 22, 1999.
(
133 ) See Presidential
Decree No. 2895, December 3, 1997.
(
134 ) See
"Operations Results for the Military Forces, National Police and DAS against
Organized Crime Groups in 1998."
(
135 ) See Report
Regarding the Field Work of the Commission for the Verification of the Agreements Signed
on July 5, 1996 between the Government and the Peasants who Peacefully Occupied the
"Antonio Roldán Betancur" Coliseum in Apartado, at 5. This commission included
representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the Presidential Human
Rights Adviser and the Office of the Procurator General, among others.
(
136 ) See
"Final Report of the Commission for Verifying the Violent Actors in Urabá," at
34-36. This commission included representatives from the Office of the Procurator General
of the Nation, the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Nation and others.
(
137 ) See
El Tiempo, "Urabá: el fin de la pesadilla", September 28, 1997.
(
138 ) See
"Capturan a diez presuntos 'paras,'" El Tiempo, September 9, 1998.
(
139 ) See
1995 Comisión Colombiana Report, at 4.
(
140 ) See
1996 Comisión Colombiana Report, at 6.
(
141 ) See
Balance Sheet, at 4.
(
142 ) To the
extent that these groups increasingly engage in armed confrontations with armed dissident
groups, further analysis will be required to determine whether their actions are in
conformity with international humanitarian law. The Commission notes that, even if certain
eventual acts of the paramilitaries were considered to be legitimate pursuant to
international humanitarian law, the State would of course still have the right and duty to
prosecute members of these illegal groups who commit acts of violence. This duty to
prosecute would exist even where members of the paramilitary groups killed members of
armed dissident groups. The paramilitary groups are not duly authorized by the State to
combat armed dissident groups. For this same reason, in those potential cases where
paramilitaries might undertake illegal acts of violence against armed dissidents with
State support or protection, the State would be responsible internationally for human
rights violations.
(
143 ) See
1995 Comisión Colombiana Report, at 23.
(
144 ) See
Balance Sheet, at 6.
(
145 ) See
Draft Report: Special Visit to the Community of El Aro, Municipality of Ituango,
Antioquia, November 28, 1997
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