OEA/Ser.L/V/II.74
REPORT
ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CHAPTER
III THE
RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY1
1. The
right to life, liberty and the security of the person are the most fundamental
of all human rights. As one
publicist has stated: "On
these, all other rights depend, without these, other rights have little or no
meaning."2 They
are protected by Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Article I of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
In the American Convention on Human Rights they are set forth in Articles
4, 5 and 7. These provisions of the
American Convention form part of internal Haitian law.
2. In
Haiti the rights to life, liberty and security historically have been at risk.
For many Haitians the Duvalier era represented the absence of the rule of
law, and consequently the violation of these rights could not be redressed by
the domestic legal system. The
National Governing Council (CNG), in spite of some early ambiguous attempts to
bring high ranking former officials to justice, can be considered to have
protected the Duvalierists. The
1987 Constitution attempted to remove Duvalierists from political life in Haiti
for a 10 year period but the killings of November 29, 1987, and the ouster of
President Leslie Manigat demonstrated that the military government is prepared
to protect the Duvalierists in their political agenda.
3. Human
rights violations and the repression institutionalized under the regime of François
Duvalier (Papa Doc) were notorious.3
Killings in Haiti
aroused no international indignation. Civil,
political, economic, social or cultural rights were non-existent.
Haiti has been considered the basked case of the hemisphere, compared by
most international organizations to countries in Africa rather than the
Americas. The human consequence has been an exodus of approximately one million
Haitians who form the "diaspora", as the Haitians term their exile
population. During the years of the
dictatorship many of these Haitians assumed influential posts in the government
of emerging African nations. At one
point in time it was estimated that almost one thousand Haitians occupied
official posts in the Congo.4 Given
that the population of Haiti is not quite six million people, the government's
relation to the diaspora is one of great importance, especially in light of the
fact that the exiles include a significant sector of the Haitian educated class. The exodus of Haitians, in particular, the phenomenon of the
"boat people" is a useful barometer in gauging the political climate.
In 1988, applications for visas to the U.S. tripled as compared with
applications in 1987, reflecting the disappointment and despair at a new
dictatorship.5
4. With
the departure of President-for-Life Jean Claude Duvalier on February 7, 1986
great expectations were created that the Duvalier era had ended.
The Haitians considered February 7, 1986 their second independence Day,
and "Haiti Libéree" became the public expression of the hour,
repeated as graffiti, on T shirts and even as the name of one of the daily
Haitian newspapers. The predictable
underside of this liberation was the demand for justice mixed with revenge.
The call for dechoukaj, which literally translates as
"uprooting", was the call for the extirpation of Duvalierism.
5. As
early as March 20, 1986, Mr. Gerard Gourgue, the most popular member of the CNG,
and also the Minister of Justice, having been the only member of the new
Government who had actively opposed Duvalier, resigned protesting the CNG's
failure to satisfy the demands of the Haitian people for justice.
Collaborators of Duvalier, such as Col. Albert Pierre, known as Ti
Boulé, head of the secret police, had been allowed surreptitiously to
depart into exile. These events
were discussed in detail in the 1985-1986 Annual Report of the Commission.
The IACHR, however, then, as now, was more concerned with the failure of
the CNG to bring to justice persons
responsible for the numerous killings which have occurred since February 7,
1986.
a.
Violations of the Right to Life and the Failure of the Government
to investigate and punish those persons responsible
6. Numerous
arbitrary killings occurred during the period 1985-1987, crescendoing in
intensity during the period leading up to the November 29, 1987 presidential and
legislative elections. The latter
period of President Manigat's government, from approximately mid-April until the
coup of June 19-20, 1988, was also characterized by a wave of violence -
murders, armed robberies, kidnappings and random but routine night-time gunfire
with cadavers left to lie on the streets the next morning, this wave of violence
ceased with the assumption of power by the military.
7. One
report of the execution-style nature of these killings stated: During
a two-week period from mid-April to early May 1988, 17 people, according to
official state hospital records, were admitted dead-on-arrival at the hospital
following shootings. This figure,
it should be noted, does not take into account those people who died from
gunshot wounds after being admitted; those whose bodies were taken by their
assailants after they had been shot, and those who were taken from their houses
at night by armed civilians and never seen again. Little
is known of the murder victims, even less of the murderers.
But the execution-style killings have prompted suggestions that they
could be politically related, or the final settling of old accounts and feuds.6
8. Precise
information regarding the number of killings which occur on a monthly basis and
the names of the victims is just beginning to be compiled by local human rights
groups, and is not available for the period under consideration in this Report.
Mr. Robert Duval, the head of the League of former Haitian Political
prisoners (LAPPH) testified in March 1988 before the UN Human Rights Commission
that the league estimated that approximately 1,500 Haitian citizens had been
killed by the Armed forces and the Macoutes since February 7, 1986.7
9. Some
killings reportedly involved Macoutes connected with the military who were
settling accounts, other killings involved persons who were targeted because
they had participated in the dechoukaj operations.
One case, reported in the press, is as follows: One
body, found on April 1, 1988 on Route No. 1 near Laffiteau, was that of Jean
Richard Alphonse, 25, resident of the Fontamara neighborhood.
He was leader of a group which, in November 1987, had been involved in
the dechoukaj of the house of Lafontaine Dominique, a well-known
Duvalierist and voodoo priest. During
the incident, an officer of the nearby Marine Corps had been wounded. Just
before his death, Alphonse had been asked to appear at the Marine Corps base,
which he did. He never made it back
home. A
friend of Alphonse, Charles Edouard Desgrottes, along with two other friends,
Adrien Berthol and Jean Fleurant, was taken into custody by the Recherches
Criminelles brigade in connection with Alphonse's murder. Desgrottes
was released after two weeks and quickly took refuge in New York.
However, Berthol and Fleurant remained in custody, and have not been
charged with any crime. Although
admitting that Alphonse, Berthol and Fleurant had participated in the ransacking
of Lafontaine's house, Desgrottes denied having been involved in the killing of
Alphonse. He said that macoutes
connected with the military were settling accounts and were killing those who
had participated in the dechoukaj operation.8
10. The
politically motivated nature of this wave of violence is evidenced by the fact
that it can be turned on and off by the military authorities.
The terror campaign which characterized the period leading up to and
including the day of the November 29, 1987 elections stands in marked contrast
to the absence of violence during the period leading up to and including the
January 17, 1988 elections. During
both periods the military authorities were in charge, although during the period
of the first elections the terror served the military's goals of having the
elections cancelled. Similarly, as
soon as President Manigat ceased to serve the goal of the military a terror
campaign was once again unleashed to destabilize him.
Once President Manigat was ousted from power the terror ceased.
Except for the controversial arrest in May 1988 of eleven (ten military
and one civilian) alleged death-squad figures by Col. Jean-Claude Paul, no one
has been arrested for any of the acts committed during these terror campaigns.
The fate of these eleven is also unknown.
11. In its
discussion with Major Gen. Williams Regala, the Minister of the Interior and
National Defense, during the Commission's on-site visit to Haiti in August 1988,
the Commission raised the issue of the death-squads, the state of insecurity and
the apparent impunity granted to these terrorists.
Major Gen. Regala denied that the macoutes were perpetrating any such
acts of terror and that a visitor to Haiti could feel more secure walking the
streets of Port-au-Prince than in New York, Washington, D.C. or Kingston,
Jamaica. In the Minister's view,
the military was guaranteeing the security of the population and Haiti was now
calm. The security of the
Commission, he assured, was guaranteed. The
Commission reminded the Minister that he had give that same guarantee to the
Haitian people just before the November 29, 1987 elections.
12. The
failure of the CNG to investigate and punish persons responsible for these
death-squad type killings has been a matter of continuing concern to the
Commission and leads it to conclude that these squads function because of the
impunity granted to them by the military. A
number of cases are discussed below which have been brought to the Commission
and to which the Government of Haiti has formulated a response.
These cases involve killings which occurred during the period of the
first military government 1986-1988, the CNG, and during which time the
Government did not investigate, or, if it did investigate, it found no one
responsible. Martissant
13. In its
1985-1986 Annual Report the Commission stated: On
March 19, 1986, it was reported to the Commission that five civilians were shot
dead by the Army's elite shock troops, the Leopards, and two days later two more
shooting deaths occurred during peaceful demonstrations.
On Saturday, April 26, six more civilians were killed and 48 wounded,
many seriously, by the security forces at a commemoration ceremony of political
opponents to the Duvalier regime who had been imprisoned at Fort Dimanche.
The Commission finds no evidence that these acts imputed to the security
forces have been investigated.
14. With
regard to the killings at Martissant on March 19, 1986, the Commission opened
Case No. 9699 and requested that the Government of Haiti supply whatever
information it deemed appropriate. The
Government replied: A
driver of a public transport vehicle, by the name of jean-Claude Roc, provoked a
traffic jam on the road to Martissant by illegally wanting to pass the car of
Army Captain Lyonel D. Sylvain. That
pursuant to Article 31 of the Manual of Military Justice and 6-3 of the
Regulations of the Haitian Armed Forces, the Captain was authorized to carry out
the functions of a police officer. That
the driver having refused to obey the orders of the Captain and having insulted
him, was liable under the provisions of Article 51 of the Decree of April 14,
1979 on vehicle traffic. The
opposition of the crowd to the arrest of the driver, its aggression against the
military making use of sticks, stones and other makeshift weapons and the
reaction of the latter caused:
1. 2
deaths on the part of the civilians and 3 injured
2. Hospitalization
of 7 military
3. Damage
caused to the vehicles one of which was an ambulance.
15. This
case illustrates the high level of social frustration and animosity against the
military in Haiti as early as one month after the departure of Jean-Claude
Duvalier. Similarly, the Government distrusts the civilian population
and finds in favor of the military as regards the apportionment of
responsibility for the killings.
16. The
Commission had a number of opportunities to speak with members of the military
during its on-site visit to Haiti in august 1988.
During those talks it became clear to the Commission that the members of
the Armed forces considered themselves superior to the so-called political
leaders, who in the eyes of the military, have no following and no mass support.
It was also evident that members of the military felt threatened by the
campaign of rache manyok (calling for the ouster of the CNG during the
summer of 1987) and that it would not again allow circumstance to reach such a
threatening point where they might be ousted from power.
One commander of a detention center expressed his disdain for the human
rights groups and the press and indicated that the victims of several atrocious
assassinations had been martyrized by these groups when, in fact, they were
responsible for worse offenses. The
human rights groups were clearly suspect to these military officials and, in
some cases, unambiguously, their enemy. Mr.
Charlot Jacquelin (Case No. 9784)
17. In 1986,
the case of the "disappearance" of Mr. Charlot Jacquelin, a teacher of
the MISYON ALFA literacy campaign project of the Catholic Church, was brought to
the attention of the Commission.
18. This
case was presented to the Commission and opened as Case No. 9784 in October
1986. The Commission was informed
that Mr. Charlot Jacquelin had been arrested on September 18, 1986 at his home
in Cité Soleil. Two individuals, one plainclothes and the other dressed in
the khaki colored uniform of the Army, reportedly entered his home at about 10
p.m., while two police officers, dressed in blue uniforms, posted guard outside.
He was aroused from his bed, made to dress and taken to the local police
station at Cité Soleil and afterwards eight police officers reportedly arrived
and took him to an unknown destination. Since
that time his whereabouts have not been revealed.
19. During
the Commission's on-site visit to Haiti in January 1987 the Commission was able
to confirm that there were a number of eye-witnesses to the arrest, and that a
crowd had formed to follow the authorities leading Mr. Charlot Jacquelin to the
Cité Soleil police station. In
response the authorities fired shots in the air to disperse the crowd, which, in
fact, dissolved.
20. Another
eyewitness claimed to have seen Mr. Jacquelin escorted by eight soldiers being
taken from the Cité Soleil police station in a green Jeep which was recognized
as the jeep which normally travels from the police station to Ft. Dimanche.
21. Another
witness testified that the arrest occurred for two reasons.
Whenever there is an attack against the military or the police, - and the
same week that Mr. Jacquelin was arrested there had been an attack at the local
police station - the authorities arrest a large number of persons for
"vengeance" and "to make money".
This witness stated that every person who is arrested has to pay money in
order to be released, and the arrest allows the security forces to blackmail the
family of the detainee for money. Consequently,
affirmed the witness, "one death in a neighborhood can permit the
government to extort $10,000 in payments, by demanding protection money from 100
persons".
22. The
Government of Haiti responded to the Commission's request for information in
this case by stating that "Charlot Jacquelin had never been arrested by the
police" in spite of the numerous eyewitnesses to the event.
No additional information has been received by the Commission on this
case in spite of the Government's expressed intent to pursue the facts leading
to this disappearance. The
Killings in 1986-1987
23. In its
1986-1987 annual Report, the commission examined again the growing state of
generalized violence in Haiti and the systematic attacks on the right to life. In that Report, the commission noted that the failure of the
military government to put an end to the violence threatened the democratization
process and, in particular, the ability of candidates to travel about the
country to campaign. The 1986-1987
Annual Report of the Commission states: As
regards violations of the right to life which have taken place since the
approval of the Commission's last Annual Report, hundreds of persons have died
at the hands of agents of the armed forces since June 29, 1987.
In addition, hundreds of persons have been wounded. Information from the Governmental Investigative Commission
gave the final figure of 255 dead in Jean Rabel.
For its part, the Haitian press has recently reported that the appearance
of cadavers on the streets of Port-au-Prince has become practically a routine
occurrence. The Commission finds
that Haiti is currently living under a generalized state of violence. The
climate of violence is manifested in the fact that the population of
Port-au-Prince does not go out on the street after 9:00 p.m. at night.
Both persons and vehicles are the subject of attack, especially in the
popular neighborhoods such as Bolosse, Cité Soleil and Bel'Air in the capital.
For example, on he morning of September 2, 1987 the bodies of Rony
Ambroise and Frequenz Charles were found machine-gunned.
An eyewitness declared that they had been taken from their homes by the
police during the night, killed and their bodies dumped on the road leading to
the airport. The Commission has
been informed that the appearance of dead bodies on he streets of Port-au-Prince
has become a daily spectacle. This
climate of violence has also affected the political panorama of the country. Whereas the elections are scheduled for November, no
candidate dares to organize an electoral campaign and travel to the provinces
since Mr. Louis Eugene Athis was killed during a political meeting at the
beginning of August. On
August 3, 1987 Louis Eugene Athis, 46 years of age, the founder and general
coordinator of the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Haiti (MODELH) was
assassinated together with two of his companions, Mr. Oscar
Dorgevil and Mr. François Jean. Athis
had traveled to Leogane, a town 20 miles west of Port-au-Prince, in order to
hold a political meting. A group of
persons armed with machetes, sticks and stones, stoned and hacked them to death
accusing them of being communists. An
additional companion Dominique Mercena, was beaten on the head, arms and left
leg, escaped and was able to bear witness to the events. The
Commission learned that the cadavers of Athis and his companions were doused
with gasoline and burned. Athis,
who had founded his party in 1964 in the Dominican Republic, was an active
defender of the rights of the Haitian "braceros" who travel to that
country to cut cane. Athis was also
one of the founders of the democratic center, which is made up of other
important presidential candidates such as Dejoie, Manigat and Bazin.
His killing can be interpreted as a signal directed to the politicians in
Haiti and it has had the result that no candidate is currently travelling in a
campaign for votes. As
regards acts of violence imputed to governmental authorities the Commission has
received, in general, information from the Haitian Government, exculpating its
agents from responsibility. The
conviction and sentencing of the military officer Robes Metellus for the killing
of a transport worker, Jules Louis, is a notable exception to the above.
But it should be stated that the transport workers staged a 5 day strike
in November 1986 to guarantee that Metellus be put on trial.
24. As
regards the case of Mr. Louis Eugène Athis, in spite of the fact that an
eyewitness survived to tell of this brutal triple murder, no one, to date, has
been brought to justice. The chef
de section9 of this
area was detained for questioning about the crime, but then unexpectedly
released. The judicial apparatus
has been mute, no one has been investigated or charged.
Pursuant to the Haitian legal system, it appears as though no crime has
been committed.
25. It is
evident now that the generalized state of fear in Haiti was systematically
created by the military government and the government-sponsored forces.
The daily experience of cadavers which are left to lie in the streets is
a potent message to the population not to challenge the authorities or the status
quo. The failure of the
government to investigate these killings and to bring anyone to justice grants
impunity to the perpetrators and evidences the complicity of the government in
these actions. The
Killings on November 28-29, 1987
26. The
killings of November 28-29, 1987 were necessary for the CNG to regain control of
the election process from the Provisional electoral Council.
The CNG established a Special Commission of Inquiry on December 3, 1987,
to investigate the events occurring at the time of the elections of November 29,
1987 (See Chapter II). The members
of this Commission included Mr. Luc Michel (President), Yves Decady, Yvan
Richard Maurasse, Col. Louis Thony Fils, Col. Fritz Courdet and Ulrick Noel.
The Commission ostensibly submitted its report to the authorities on
January 15, 1988, although it was not made public at that time.
Radio Metropole announced on April 4, 1988 that the Commission had issued
its report.
27. The
Report of the Special Investigative committee consists of 25 pages and is the
first investigative report that gives the appearance of being serious.
The mandate of this body was to examine the causes and circumstances
surrounding the events which occurred on November 29, 1987, and to identify the
perpetrators.10
28. The
Committee carried out its mandate by interviewing witnesses both in
Port-au-Prince and in the provinces, visiting the hospital of the State
University to speak with victims of the November 29, 1987 massacre, interviewing
political leaders to receive their views on the national situation, and visiting
the hospital at Canapé-Vert.11
29. The
Report is unusual in its willingness to criticize the Duvalier-Macoute forces
and in its analysis of the causes and circumstances surrounding the events of
November 29, 1987, but its examination of the forces involved obeys the implicit
governmental mandate not to implicate the military.
As regards the Army the Report states that:
The
Army did not participate in the struggle for power since it does not have any
political ambitions…12
30. And as
concerns the role of the Duvalierists:
The Duvalierists, insofar as they are the heirs of the revolutionary
conquest of 1946, are intent upon reconquering power…13
31. The Report states that it is impossible to
identify the individual perpetrators of the acts of violence and sabotage.
In the provinces many of them were individuals who came from other areas
and the majority of them were masked in order to hide their identities.
In addition, "the strategy adopted by the perpetrators of the acts
of violence and sabotage, which are the object of the present investigation,
appears to have been not to leave any traces".14
32. The Report identifies responsibility with the
Commissaire du Gouvernement, whose job it is to investigate crimes which
have been committed; the Police, for not having established a cordon
de sécurité; Ministry
of Information and Coordination, for not having raised the educational level of
the masses by means of programs dealing with civic
education; the Public Authorities, for not having carried out a policy of
firmness to prevent any actions which would lead to the deterioration of the
political climate; and, lastly, the Provisional Electoral Council or having
permitted foreign powers to be involved in domestic affairs and for not having
recognized "the impossibility of carrying out these elections prior to the
massacre which occurred on the ruelle Vaillant".15
33. The Report concludes that it is
possible to believe that (il est permis de croire) the Duvalier-Macoute
forces were the perpetrators of these atrocities.
However, the Report attempts to justify their actions as a form of
self-defense:
Decapitated, hounded, persecuted and burned alive following February 6,
1986, and in the face of the imminent resurgence of such acts following the
results of the elections of last November, as a consequence of their will to
survive, the macoutes would be constrained to defend themselves.16
34. As regards the accusation that Macoute-Army
forces were also involved, the Report states that it is not possible "to
establish that there were Macoute-Army forces involved in the acts of
November," however, it avoids a categorical denial by explaining that it is
"inappropriate to accuse the Army as a whole, despite the continuing
conflict between the CEP/CNG, for the electoral violence for which certain
elements are guilty which have been difficult to identify".17
35. The Commission concludes that it was unable
to identify the perpetrators because the witnesses, such as the members of the
CEP, refused to testify before the Commission, and the victims, fearing
reprisals, refused to speak the truth. Given
the fact that two Colonels comprised part of this Investigative Commission, the
reticence of the members of the CEP and of the victims is easily understood.
The Report states that although the Commission has been unable to
identify the individual perpetrators, it has been able to identify them
"collectively", and calls upon the Commissaire du Gouvernement
to investigate the punish these crimes.18
36. This odd bit of "legalism", handing
the problem over to the Commissaire du Gouvernement is in curious
contradiction with the Report's earlier finding that the judicial system was
"pusillanimous and impotent" as regards bringing to justice those
participants in the dechoukaj who burned alive notorious macoutes.
37. The
Report recommends that the investigation remain open and that reparations be
made to those persons who suffered material and physical damages on November 29,
1987.
38. During
the visit of the Commission to Haiti in August 1988, it asked the Minister of
Justice questions regarding some conclusions and recommendations in this Report,
in particular, why the persons responsible for the killings of November 29, 1987
had not been prosecuted and whether a reparations policy had been instituted for
the victims and their relatives who had suffered corporal or material damages as
a result of the events of November 29, 1987.
The Minister replied that no prosecutions had been initiated against the
perpetrators of the killings and other acts of violence on election day because
the Ministry "cannot find the victims". As regards the issue of reparations the Minister had not seen
the Report of the Commission of Inquiry and was unfamiliar with its
recommendations. Mr. Yvan-Richard
Maurasse, currently the head of the Department of Detention in the Ministry of
Justice was present at the meeting of the IACHR delegation with the Minister of
Justice. Mr. Maurasse was asked how
could it be possible that a member of the staff of the Justice Ministry who was
also a member of the Commission of Inquiry, had not communicated the results of
this Report to the Minister of Justice. The
reply was that the Commission of Inquiry submitted its Report to the CNG but
that it had not been communicated by the CNG to the respective Ministers.
The IACHR delegation provided the Minister with its copy of the Report
and a photocopy was made. The IACHR
delegation asked the Minister whether he would support a policy of reparations
for the victims of the November 29, 1987 violence and the Minister replied that
the matter did not fall within his competence.
39. The
Report also recommended some sweeping measures for dealing with the security
problem. It recommended that "energetic and appropriate measures
… be taken by the Police in order to eliminate any individual agitator ("perturbateur")
or person susceptible of disturbing the ordre public, and to
dismantle the identified breeding centers of crime which serve as a culture
medium for anti-social conduct".19
This recommendation can be read on its face, as a carte blanche
to the authorities to eliminate any assembled group of unionized workers,
students, religious workers, and the like, who are against the government.
Another excessive measure recommended by the Report is one which calls
for "periodic searches" to be conducted throughout the country in
order to locate and seize illegal arms.20 The searches which have been carried out have not
been conducted pursuant to the dictates of the Haitian Constitution of 1987 (infra). 40. Whereas Brig. Gen. Hérard Abraham, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, met with the delegation of the IACHR in August 1988 in civilian attire, the Minister of Justice, Brig. Gen. Fritz Antoine, was in uniform. The Minister of Justice described to the Commission his efforts to improve the administration of justice in Port-au-Prince and in the provinces. He gave the Commission copies of two speeches he had delivered on August 26, 1988, one in Saint Marc and the other in Gonaives. These speeches call on the Justice Ministry officials in the Artibonite region to serve Law and Justice. "The time has come", he stated "for Haitian Justice to be transparent at all levels of our judicial institutions". The Minister of Justice stated that he is visiting all 15 judicial jurisdictions of the country, and that in light of the "endemic violence" in the Artibonite, Lt. Gen. Namphy plans to put an end to the "turpitudes of certain functionaries and agents of the Ministry of Justice" so that peace will return to the region. continued... [ Table of Contents |
Previous |
Next ]
1. Article
4 of the American Convention provides:
1. Every person has the
right to have his life respected. This
right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court and in accordance with a law establishing such
punishment, enacted prior to the commission of the crime.
The application of such punishment shall not be extended to crimes to
which it does not presently apply. 3.
The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that have
abolished it. 4. In no case shall
capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or related common crimes.
5. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at
the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of
age; nor shall it be applied to pregnant women. 6. Every person
condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or
commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all cases.
Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is pending
decision by the competent authority.
Article 5 of the American Convention provides:
1. Every person has the
right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected.
2. No one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.
All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for
the inherent dignity of the human person. 3.
Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated
from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate
to their status as unconvicted persons. 4.
Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated
from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate
to their status as unconvicted persons. 5.
Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from
adults and brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so
that they may be treated in accordance with their status as minors.
6. Punishments consisting of
deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social
readaptation of the prisoners.
Article 7 of the American Convention provides:
1. Every person has the
right to personal liberty and security. 2.
No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons
and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State
Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.
3. No one shall be subject
to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. 4.
Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the reasons for his detention
and shall be promptly notified of the charge or charges against him.
5. Any person detained shall
be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be brought to trial within a reasonable time,
or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings.
His release may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for
trial. 6.
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a
competent court, in order that the court may decide without daily on the
lawfulness of his arrest or detention, and order his release if the arrest or
detention is unlawful. In States
Parties the laws of which provide that anyone who believes himself to be
threatened with deprivation of his liberty has the right of recourse to a
competent tribunal in order that it may decide on the legality of such threat,
this remedy may not be restricted or abolished.
The interested party, or another person on his behalf, is entitled to
invoke these remedies. 7.
No one shall be detained for debt. This
principle shall not limit the orders of a competent judicial authority issued
for nonfulfillment of duties of support.
2. See,
Yoram Dinstein: "The Right to
Life, Physical Integrity and Liberty" in The International Bill of
Rights, Ed. Louis Henkin (1981).
3. See,
for example, Papa Doc and the Tonton Macoutes by Bernard Diederich and Al
Burt (reissued 1986).
4. Id.
At p. 370.
5. Communiqué
de l'USIS "Procédures à suivre pour l'obtention du visa de
non-immigrant" in Le Petit Samedi Soir No. 723, 6-12 August 1988.
6. "Crime
or Politics", Jean-Pierre Cloutier, Haiti Times, The English language
newspaper of Haiti, June 1988.
7. LAPPH:
Le Militant, No. 8, Mai 1988.
8. See,
note 6 (supra)
9. The
chef de section in the Duvalierist political structure was the head of
the smallest territorial grouping. These
chefs were handpicked by the president himself.
10. See, Rapport
de la Commission d'Enquête, January 1988.
11. Id.
12. Id. at
p. 6.
13. Id.
14. Id. at
p. 17.
15. Id. at
pp. 19-20.
16. Id. at
p. 21.
17. Id. at
p. 22.
18. Id. at
p. 24.
|