HONDURAS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COUP D’ÉTAT

IV.       EVALUATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

160.      From the date of the coup d’état to the date of the preparation of this report, the IACHR has compiled information from a variety of sources: political and social actors, civil society organizations and citizens, all concerning the human rights situation in Honduras.  During its on-site visit, the Commission had an opportunity to speak personally with these sources and with State authorities, all for the purpose of compiling complete information on the human rights situation in that country as a result of the coup d’état. 

161.          Various types of information were considered when preparing this report:  testimony and complaints, newspaper articles, reports prepared by human rights organizations and information from civil society in general, photographs, videos, presentations, case files, court proceedings, memorandums, and information supplied by state entities.  Consideration was also given to international law and the Constitution and laws in effect in Honduras.  In order to protect their lives and personal integrity, persons who testified before the Commission are identified in this report only by their initials.

162.          Because it has no basis in either the Constitution or the law, the de facto regime’s declaration of a state of emergency is null and void ab initio.  In the immediate wake of the coup d’état and for a period of time thereafter, the de facto authorities announced, via a national broadcasting network, the enforcement of curfews during certain times of the day and in certain parts of the country.  This was an excessive measure not duly justified.  Only two executive decrees were issued specifically spelling out the period of the curfew and the guarantees being suspended with the curfew.  In the first case, the state of emergency continued beyond the period of time stipulated in the decree; in the second case, the decree was revoked before the stipulated duration of the state of emergency had expired.

163.          Under the American Convention, certain rights may not be suspended under any circumstances.  But in the midst of the institutional crisis that Honduras was experiencing, the arbitrary and prolonged suspension of constitutional guarantees took a heavy toll on the right to life, humane treatment, personal liberty, freedom of expression, sexual integrity, equality and nondiscrimination, the right to strike, the right to education, judicial guarantees, and others.

164.          The repeated curfews, the militarization of the national territory, the primacy of military power over civilian power, and the inefficacy of the judicial mechanisms, all placed the public in a defenseless situation, which created a favorable climate for the perpetration of human rights violations.

A.         The Role of Human Rights Defenders

165.     Apropos the situation of human rights defenders, the Inter-American Democratic Charter underlines the importance of the permanent, ethical, and responsible participation of citizens within the law and the constitutional order vis-a-vis the development of democracy.  Human rights defenders, from different sectors of civil society and, in some cases, from state institutions, make fundamental contributions to enable democratic societies to exist and become stronger.  Accordingly, respect for human rights in a democratic state largely depends on whether human rights defenders are able to enjoy effective and adequate guarantees that allow them to conduct their activities freely.[163]

166.          For more than a decade the OAS General Assembly has repeatedly addressed the importance of protecting human rights defenders and has demonstrated the OAS’s profound concern over the situation of human rights defenders and their organizations. On June 8, 1990, by resolution AG/RES. 1044, the General Assembly reiterated "the recommendation made in prior years to the governments of the member states that they grant the necessary guarantees and facilities to enable nongovernmental human rights organizations to continue contributing to the promotion and protection of human rights, and that they respect the freedom and safety of the members of such organizations.”[164]

167.          For his part, the United Nations Secretary-General has said that "Human rights defenders are at the core of the human rights movement the world over. They work at democratic transformation in order to increase the participation of people in the decision-making that shapes their lives. Human rights defenders contribute to the improvement of social, political and economical conditions, the reduction of social and political tensions, the building-up of a peaceful environment, domestically and internationally, and the nurturing of national and international awareness of human rights.  They form the base upon which regional and international human rights organizations and mechanisms, including those within the United Nations, build the promotion and protection of human rights”.[165]

168.          The Commission values and acknowledges the important role of human rights defenders and it has constantly monitored their situation in the Hemisphere.  Honduras has been no exception.  Quite the contrary: the IACHR has followed up on the difficulties that, for decades now, have obstructed and impaired the work of human rights defenders in that country.  These difficulties have increased with the institutional crisis.

169.          Since June 28, a number of civil society organizations have openly expressed their opposition to the coup d’état:  the Equipo de Reflexión, Investigación y Comunicación Compañía de Jesús (ERIC) [Jesuit Ministries’ Team of Reflection, Research and Communication]; the Asociación de Jueces para la Democracia [Association of Judges for Democracy]; the Centro de Derechos de la Mujer (CDM) [the Women’s Rights Center]; the Consejo Cívico de Organizaciones Populares e Indígenas de Honduras (COPIHN) [the Civic Council of Grassroots and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras]; the Centro para la Prevención, Tratamiento y Rehabilitación de Víctimas de Tortura (CPTRT) [Center for the Prevention of Torture and Treatment and Rehabilitation of its Victims and Their Families]; the Centro de Estudios de la Mujer (CEM-H) [Women’s Studies Center]; the Asociación Arco Iris [Rainbow Association]; Jha Jha; the Bloque Popular de Honduras; the Coordinadora de Resistencia Popular [Coordinator of Grassroots Resistance]; the Coordinadora de Organizaciones Populares del Aguán (COPA) [Coordinator of Grassroots Organizations of El Aguán]; the Organización Fraternal Negra (OFRANEH) [Black Fraternal Organization]; the Movimiento Ambientalista de Olancho (MAO) [Olancho Environmentalist Organization]; the Asociación LGTB Arcoiris de Honduras [LGTB Rainbow Association of Honduras]; the Federación de Tribus Xicaques de Yoro (FETRIXY) [Federation of Yoro Xicaque Tribes]; the Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH) [Center for Research and Promotion of Human Rights]; the Comité de Familiares Detenidos – Desaparecidos de Honduras (COFADEH) [Committee of Relatives of Detainees – Disappeared of Honduras],and the Asociación de Organismos No Gubernamentales (ASONOG) [Association of Nongovernmental Organizations].

170.          These organizations have taken on an active role in protecting human rights as the number of complaints has increased.  Some of them had to reorganize their daily routines in order to process complaints filed by those who reach them.  Since the coup d’état in Honduras, the Commission has received information to the effect that numerous human rights defenders were in danger.[166]  Some human rights organizations filed complaints with the Commission about the means being used by the State to harass[167] human rights defenders.  These techniques included the institution of police and judicial inquiries, arbitrary detentions,[168] assaults,[169] intimidation, surveillance and stalking.[170]  It was also reported that some of these organizations had had the power cut to their officers, their communication systems disrupted, and their e-mail accounts interfered with.[171]  Some offices were fired upon by heavily armed individuals[172] and explosive devices were thrown.[173]  Others were searched.[174]

171.          The human rights defenders also described the difficulties they have entering hospitals, detention centers and other places that –although not authorized by law to house detainees- are nonetheless being used to hold victims of arbitrary detention. They also complained of the difficulty they encounter in gaining access to court records, since bureaucratic steps are now required that were not necessary prior to the coup d’état.  By way of example, it was reported that when the police and military roadblocks were in place on July 24 and 25, human rights defenders were not allowed to enter command posts and areas where persons were detained.  They were also denied access to police public records.  During the demonstration in Comayagüela on July 30, in which Professor Vallejo and other persons were injured, human rights defenders were not allowed inside the detention center, with the exception of two attorneys who were already at the premises before the events occurred.  Professor Vallejo died two days later.  Finally, on August 11, no one was allowed in to represent those held in custody at Metropolitan Police Headquarters No. 1, also known as CORE VII.  The Office of the Prosecutor on Duty at the Combined[175] Center of Justice had allegedly refused to allow communication with the prosecutors to find out what the charges against the accused would be.[176]

172.          The work of the human rights defenders was made all the more difficult because they were unable to move around during the curfew hours.  This circumstance made it impossible for them to assist victims at night.  The de facto authorities had allegedly announced in the media that they would bring criminal charges against human rights organizations that slandered them with accusations of human rights violations.[177]

173.          For example, one of the attorneys from CIPRODEH said that she was standing on the corner opposite the Central Bank on August 12, at around 3:30 p.m., receiving complaints from relatives of persons being held in the columned patio area [“Los Bajos”] of the National Congress building.  She said that she was being filmed and photographed by members of the security forces.  When she saw how the security forces were beating, kicking, punching and clubbing an individual, even though they already had that individual subdued, she began to take photographs.  What happened next was that the police allegedly began slapping her, hitting her with their clubs and punching her in the head and chest; they dragged her by the hair through the patio area and allegedly tried to take away her camera.  The security forces told her to “stop causing problems for them with [her] photographs; they told [her] to go hell; [that if she was] not a journalist [but] a human rights defender, all the worse because because of them we’re all screwed.”[178]

174.          In the work they do, human rights defenders have not been able to rely on the cooperation of state entities charged with the protection and defense of human rights. The human rights defenders criticized the inactivity of the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights and the Office of the National Commissioner of Human Rights.[179]  Neither of those institutions raised any objection to the decree ordering suspension of guarantees; they did not institute inspections or investigations for confiscation of materials whose use against demonstrators was prohibited (pepper spray, pipes, baseball bats, clubs and chains); they failed to order the release of persons being held unlawfully in places not certified as detention facilities; and they never took statements from the police and military personnel in command of area operations.[180]

175.          The Commission is concerned by the news regarding the role played by National Commissioner of Human Rights, Ramón Custodio López. By denying the existence of the coup d’état he prevented the inhabitants of Honduras from gaining access to an independent mechanism for the protection of their human rights.  The day the coup d’état took place, he issued international statements via CNN cable television alleging that there was no coup d’état in Honduras and that the President had been removed by Congress “in application of domestic law.”  He also participated in the press conference where it was announced that Mr. Micheletti had “taken office”.[181]  On July 1, he announced his own proposal for legitimizing the exercise of national sovereignty and the people’s right of self-determination: presenting the question of “citizen” José Manuel Zelaya’s return to the Presidency to the Honduran people via a plebiscite consisting of a simple “Yes” or “No” question.[182]  The official Web page of the institution had an announcement stating that “the most viable avenue to solve the problem is for Manuel Zelaya Rosales to announce that he is abandoning his hopes of returning to the Presidency.”[183] Mr. Custodio issued the following statement:

…human rights are being respected in Honduras… the only guarantee that has been suspended is freedom of movement, [… he also applauded the fact that this restriction of basic civil liberties had reduced the crime rate in Honduras], ‘something that was never achieved in the three previous administrations.[184]

176.          For human rights defenders, Mr. Custodio’s attitude meant that victims of human rights violations were left with no means of defense, have lost their belief in the institution and are fearful of visiting the offices of the National Commissioner of Human Rights to ask for help.[185]  The situation is even worse for victims who live in areas of the country where nongovernmental human rights organizations have no presence.[186]

177.          Some human rights defenders believe that while the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights does respond to complaints, it is too bureaucratic, as it “confines itself to reviewing books and official documents of the police, military and Public Prosecutor’s office; in cases of arbitrary detentions, it refrains from taking statements from victims of human rights violations, even those who are seriously injured or wounded.”[187]  On the other hand, they also said that the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights did seek and advance some protective actions, even against measures taken by the de facto government.[188]

B.         The Situation of Political Authorities and other Authorities and Community Leaders

178.          Since the coup d’état, many officials in President Zelaya’s cabinet have told the Commission about situations that put their lives and personal integrity at risk.  They have also reported that they have become the target of administrative and criminal investigations in retaliation for their support of President Zelaya.[189]

179.          During the Commission’s visit with President Zelaya’s family, the President’s wife complained of a smear campaign being waged against the family and about publication of defamatory reports in the official media, a situation that the Commission was able to confirm for itself during its on-site visit.  She also said that while the military roadblocks were in place, the family had to seek safe haven in the mountains and requested asylum in embassies to avoid being deported.  However, when Isis Obed Murillo was killed, they decided to leave the embassies and join the demonstrations.

180.          Concerning the events that transpired in El Paraíso, the President’s wife reported that they were trapped for five days, unable to move and without food or medication.  When a petition of amparo was filed on her behalf, a judge executor appeared on the scene with an order that would have allowed the President’s wife, but no one else, to leave.  She therefore decided to remain with the people. She recounted how they spent the night in a hotel and that at around 12:30 a.m. they heard two shots; then police ordered them to leave and gave them until 6:00 a.m. to do so.

181.          Finally, the President’s wife indicated that their cell phones were being tapped, and that their personal accounts and credit cards had been frozen.  It was only on the day of the Commission’s visit with her, August 18, that they had been able to use one credit card.  She also said that they were allegedly accusing one of her sons of drug trafficking, while the home of a nephew had been searched.

182.          As for Honduran diplomats, on July 17 the de facto government dismissed 16 members of the diplomatic corps.[190] The IACHR immediately received the testimony of the Charge d’Affaires at the Honduran Embassy to the Costa Rican Government to the effect that diplomatic personnel were being threatened and that the media were circulating stories to the effect that diplomats who supported the Constitutional President were guilty of usurpation of functions, contempt, disobedience and appropriation of assets, public and otherwise, and that the cases would be turned over to the Superior Court of Accounts, the Attorney General’s Office and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in order to establish the appropriate criminal, civil and administrative responsibilities.  He also reported that the de facto authorities are retaining diplomatic passports, making it difficult for diplomats and their families to return.[191]

183.          By the same token, some mayors and local government officials and employees reported that arrest warrants had been issued against them and that they were being persecuted, harassed and threatened by the security forces.[192] These episodes have been labeled “municipal coup d’état” as their purpose is to minimize resistance work on the part of those who “still have political leadership positions and who have openly expressed their opposition to the coup d’état.”[193]  The Commission took testimony from three mayors.

184.          The Mayor of San José de Colinas in the department of Santa Bárbara recounted how that community had been in favor of the consultation from the outset, which is why a smear campaign was launched.  In his case, an investigation of his accounts had been ordered, because he was supposedly suspected of receiving monies from abroad. Also, an investigation of his assets had allegedly been instituted.  On June 26, two days before the “fourth ballot box,” while the mayor was attending an assembly at a school in the community of La Victoria, there had allegedly been a shooting.  The Police Chief’s explanation of the shooting was reportedly that the mayor himself “was to blame, because he was roaming around at night.”  On June 28, the day of the coup d’état, the Army had tried to arrest the mayor and had threatened to make them disappear.

185.          According to reports, all projects in the municipality were brought to a halt; the opening of an office of the BANADESA state bank, a BANASUPRO store and other projects were suspended.  The 5% monthly transfer that the national government is required to send to all local governments was also suspended. [194]

186.          The Mayor of El Paraíso stated that the curfew caused significant financial and economic damage and cut tax revenues.  Specifically, he reported that between July 24 and 27 the authorities told him that a warrant had been issued for his arrest.  He also complained that the Office of the Mayor had experienced direct and indirect interference i.e.:  a) military troops had taken over the mayor’s office; b) when they wanted to execute projects started under the Administration of President Zelaya, they were told that the money was not there because project funding had been suspended; c) social projects were brought to a complete halt; d) many members of the community were afraid to report human rights violations, and e) the municipalities that were supporters of the de facto government were allotted funding to carry out projects.[195]

187.          The wife of the Mayor of the Incorporated Municipality of San Pedro Sula reported that on June 28, at around 5:00 a.m., about 12 people were at her home making preparations for the consultation or “fourth ballot box.” At around 5:30 a.m., the mayor received a phone call in which he was told that soldiers were heading to his home; the caller suggested that anyone there should get out. A few moments later, unidentified Army personnel, without any written authorization, entered the mayor’s home, detained him and took him to the headquarters of the 105^th Brigade.  The mayor’s wife spoke with an employee at the Embassy of the United States in Honduras, since the individual in question was a United States citizen.  Later, his wife said that the mayor had sent her a text message in which he asked for a suitcase and told her that he was leaving the country to save his life.  According to what the mayor’s wife told the Commission, after that the authorities of the de facto government and members of political and business groups brought pressure to bear on the mayor to force him to resign and to abandon his bid for re-election as the Liberal Party candidate.  The threat was that criminal charges would be brought against him.[196]

188.          The IACHR also received reports indicating that state employees in various offices were arbitrarily dismissed because of their opposition to the coup d’état,[197] while still more were threatened.[198]

189.          A group of congressmen in the Liberal Party held a press conference to condemn the coup d’état and complained that they had not been convened to the session for the session where Congress appointed Mr. Micheletti as President of the Republic, in the manner prescribed by law. They also pointed out that their seats in Congress had been unlawfully taken over so that the de facto authorities could claim that Mr. Micheletti’s appointment had been unanimous.  After making these statements, a number of those congressmen were threatened, persecuted, and harassed: they were followed, shots were fired near their homes, fabricated evidence was planted, investigations were launched on charges of sedition and treason, and their bank accounts were frozen.[199]

190.          The Commission also received reports that the following political leaders were threatened with arrest warrants and were persecuted, beaten and unlawfully detained by security forces: Carlos Amaya Funez, Director of the Asamblea Popular Permanente [Permanent Popular Assembly] (APP) of El  Progreso, Yoro, and Leader of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores [Socialist Workers Party] (PST); Margarita Murillo, Foro Social del Valle de Sula [Valle de Sula Social Forum] and Coordinator of the Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular [National Popular Resistance Front], northwestern district;  María Luisa Regalado, Coordinator of the Colectiva de Mujeres de Honduras [Honduran Women’s Cooperative] (CODEMUH); Onelia Josefa Ramírez Torres, Director of the Bloque Popular and Coordinator of the Milagro de San Pedro Sula Mission; Farabundo Murillo Godoy, Director of the Frente de Abogados de la Resistencia Popular [Popular Resistance Lawyers’ Front] and Director of the Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular [National Popular Resistance Front], northwestern district; Samuel Montes Alberto, Director of the Bloque Popular; Manuel López, Director of the Coordinadora del Frente de Resistencia Popular [Steering Committee of the Popular Resistance Front] in San Pedro Sula and Member of the Board of the Federación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras [National Federation of Honduran Campesinos] (FENACH); José Edgardo Castro Rodríguez, journalists and Liberal Party candidate for Congress; Mario Arturo Padilla Mendoza, candidate for the National Congress, and Maribel Barahona, Democratic Unification Party candidate for Congress.

191.          In its observations the Supreme Court wrote the following: “Concerning the alleged acts of intimidation, threats, physical assaults and arbitrary detentions supposedly committed against certain political leaders, the truth is quite the opposite:  these people participated in the demonstrations and, together with certain NGOs, incited acts of vandalism and the use of explosive devices; their actions were suppressed, as the videos in the custody of the National Police show.[200]

192.          Officials in the judicial branch were also affected by the coup d’état. The “Asociación de Jueces por la Democracia” [Association of Judges for Democracy] reported transfers,[201] removals from the bench, and appointments not made according to legal procedure.  It also told the Commission that those officials in the judicial branch who opposed the coup d’état were threatened, attacked and unlawfully detained.[202] Others judicial authorities were subjected to disciplinary action[203] and other forms of harassment.^[204]  It was also reported that the Justices on the Supreme Court received telephone calls and messages, both from the Armed Forces and private enterprise, demanding that judges and judicial authorities who opposed the coup d’état be made an example of what can happen to those who oppose it.

193.          The Commission received testimony from one of Tegucigalpa’s criminal trial judges.  On August 12, that judge was presiding over night court and heard the prosecutorial request seeking indictment of three individuals on charges of arson involving Popeye’s restaurant in Colonia Miraflores and a city bus.  The hearing to take statements from the accused was held at night. The purpose of such a hearing is to decide what will happen to the individuals being charged.  The judge decided to order the following alternatives for the accused:  court appearance three times weekly; a restriction against leaving the municipality of the central District; guardianship and surveillance by one of the defense attorneys; and a ban on any communication and contact with any office of the INTUR enterprise. None of the parties filed any objection to that decision.[205]  According to the Judge’s testimony, because of the alternative measures she ordered, she was removed from the case and requests were filed seeking her removal from the bench.[206]  At the meeting that the Commission held with the justices of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, the justices asserted that the judge in question did not continue in the case because she had originally heard the case as night-court judge; they explained that the judge on the bench for night court would only take the accused’ statement; the hearing itself, they said, would be held in day court, with the competent judge presiding. The justices did not offer any information concerning the requests that had allegedly been made seeking to have the night-court judge removed from the bench.

194.          According to information supplied to the IACHR, numerous community leaders were in danger while others were threatened,[207] beaten and pursued because of arrests warrants issued against them for their participation in marches protesting against the de facto regime.[208] Among them were the following: Carlos Eduardo Reina, a member of the Comité Nacional de Resistencia [National Resistance Committee]; Eulogio Chávez, a member of the Comité Nacional de Resistencia [National Resistance Committee]; Carlos Humberto Reyes, Secretary General of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Bebida y Similares [Beverage and Related Industries Labor Union] and a member of the Bloque Popular; Rafael Alegría, a national director of the Vía Campesina; Roger Ulises Peña, a member of organized labor; Salvador Zúñiga, Consejo Cívico de Organizaciones Populares e Indígenas de Honduras [Civic Council of Grassroots and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras]; Ángel Alvarado, a member of the Comité Nacional de Resistencia [National Resistance Committee]; Buenaventura Calderón, a community leader from  Puerto Lempira in the department of Gracias a Dios; Evelio Sánchez, a community leader from Guapinol, Tocoa, Colón; Fabio Ochoa, Local President of the Partido Unificación Democrática [Democratic Unification Party] in Tocoa; Felipe Antonio Gutiérrez, a community leader in Guapinol, Tocoa, Colón; Humberto Maldonado, a community leader in Guapinol, Tocoa, Colón; Iris Munguía, Coordinator of Sindicatos  Bananeros de Honduras [Honduran Banana Workers Unions]; Manuel Membreño, a community leader in  Guapinol, Tocoa, Colón; Waldemar Cabrera, a community leader in Puerto Lempira, department of Gracias a Dios; Wilfredo Paz Maestro, a member of the Federación de Organizaciones Magisteriales de Honduras [Federation of Teachers Organizations of Honduras]; Elsy Benegas, President of the Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto Nacional Agrario [National Agrarian Institute Workers Union] and a leader  of the Steering Committee of Organizaciones Populares del Aguan [El Aguan Grassroots Organizations] (COPA); Manuel Montoya, director of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica [National Electric Power Company Labor Union]; Eduardo Flores, a member of the Steering Committee of Organizaciones Populares del Aguan [El Aguan Grassroots Organizations] (COPA); Carlos Mencía, a campesino leader and candidate for Congress nominated by the Partido Unificación Democrática [Democratic Unification Party]; Lety Orfilia Figueroa Rivera, a community leader in Guapinol, Tocoa, Colón; Melany Mercedes Perdomo Gaitán, a community leader in Guapinol, Tocoa, Colón; and Paula Durán, a teacher and former municipal commissioner for human rights and a leader of the local women’s organization.  Another seven community leaders had allegedly been charged with the crime of sedition after being detained during a public demonstration on June 30, in the city of El Progreso.[209]

195.          During its visit, the Commission was able to confirm that political authorities, community leaders and public officials who voiced opposition to the coup d’état experienced situations that endangered their lives and personal integrity, as did members of the family of President Zelaya.  They were threatened, pursued, beaten, harassed and/or investigated by the courts.

196.          During the Commission’s 137th regular session, it received a communiqué that the Head of the Army’s Human Resources Section had sent to a Mayor. It read as follows:

The purpose of this message is to enlist your assistance by providing the following: a) names and telephone numbers of your community leaders who are members of the Unidad Cívica Democrática and who are engaged in working with the municipality for the welfare of its people; b) names and telephone numbers of leaders in the resistance who are disrupting your community’s plans.  Mr. Mayor, we need this information as quickly as possible as we will shortly be paying you a visit, so that day by day we become better prepared to strengthen our democratic system.[210]

197.          The IACHR is concerned by the note that the Honduran Army sent to the Mayors.  This note confirms how deep the rift with democratic and constitutional order was, and the intelligence work done against persons who publicly expressed their condemnation of the coup d’état.

C.         The Impact on Specific Groups

198.    The IACHR has received information indicating a surge in discrimination against certain social groups that have historically been excluded and discriminated against in Honduras.  The situation of particular groups has become noticeably worse, specifically Nicaraguan nationals, the Garifuna and members of the gay community.

199.          The International Observation Mission for the Human Rights Situation in Honduras reported that on July 20 and 21, members of the Mission witnessed the human rights violations that a group of young people of Nicaraguan nationality suffered.  They were arbitrarily detained for supposed administrative violations of immigration law.  These young people were mistreated, were not advised that they could request the assistance of the Nicaraguan consulate, were not brought before a judge and did not have access to a defense attorney.  The conditions in which they were incarcerated were entirely inappropriate; in some cases, they were held in police cells mixed with persons accused of common crimes.[211]  The Commission also received information to the effect that on July 26, 6 Nicaraguans were singled out to be detained at the police station in El Paraíso.[212]

200.          Strict measures were allegedly used to control the entry of foreign nationals into the country.  The control of Nicaraguan nationals entering or leaving the country was tightened, even though both countries are parties to the free transit convention; it was also reported that investigations had been launched into foreign nationals, especially Nicaraguans, Cubans and Venezuelans.[213] 

201.          There were also complaints of more than 150 Nicaraguans and Venezuelans being arbitrarily detained in Choluteca, El Progreso, San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa as a result of searches conducted in hotels, motels, restaurants and on main highways,[214] information that the highest-ranking police officials confirmed.

202.          The Supreme Court wrote the following in its observations: “The Honduran state regulates immigration through the Office of the Director General for Immigration and Alien Affairs in order to ensure the security of the public and of the State; to that end, periodic control and oversight checks are conducted which range from specific operations at police posts, inspection of hotels, places of public and private employment, inspections of inter-urban transportation units, etc., all in coordination with the National Police.”[215]

203.          According to information received, while the military and police roadblocks were in place, the Garifuna had allegedly been particularly mistreated and endured hunger and overcrowded conditions:[216] “the coup d’état has exacerbated racial discrimination.  If there are more than 5 Garifuna congregated in the same place, they are detained; when they traveled to the border they were told they needed a special permit”.[217]

204.          On July 29, the National Police selectively detained seven Garifuna.  The Police agents took away their identification papers and their musical instruments.  They told them that the Garifuna were prohibited from leaving the Caribbean coastline without a special permit.[218]  Referring to these incidents, the de facto authorities sent the Commission a communication in which they stated that according to an August 21 report issued by the National Directorate of the Preventive Police, “in enforcing the curfew, ten persons were detained for approximately two hours, after which they were released, save for one person who was allegedly held pending trial and an arrest warrant had been issued for him on suspicion of robbery.”[219]

205.          On August 31, the IACHR received information to the effect that the Garifuna Community Hospital in Ciriboya had been downgraded to health center status. According to reports, this measure was taken as a reprisal for the role that Dr. Luther Castillo –a Garifuna and founder of that hospital- had played in resistance actions against the coup d’état.[220] According to the complaint, the Garifuna Community Hospital had long been practicing medicine in a way that respected the traditions and customs of the Garifuna community.  The hospital had reportedly now been converted, however, into a health center practicing traditional medicine without respecting the Garifuna community’s cultural vision.[221]

206.          As for the situation of members of the gay community, a human rights defender complained that on July 8, while monitoring the situation of transsexuals and gays in El Obelisco Park in Comayagüela, he was verbally assaulted and then beaten up by 7 soldiers who were guards for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  At that time, a group of persons approached to see what was happening, whereupon the soldiers withdrew saying the following:

Heh, fag, you and the other two who hang out here are going to pay us sooner or later; if not, we’ll take you up the little mountain and shoot you in the head, and no one will ever know who did it  ….[222]