16.     The pertinent parts of the minority Report written by Senator Javier Díez Canseco Cisneros read as follows: 

          I.        A CHRONOLOGY OF THE COMMISSION'S ACTIVITIES  

                   1.       Two bills were introduced at the Senate session held on May 17; they proposed that an Investigating Commission be established in connection with the events that had been reported. 

                   2.       On May 20, Senator Javier Díez Canseco set out with deputies Arístides Valer, Yehude Simon, Frine Peña, Gustavo Espinoza, Fernando Olivera and Germán Medina, and travelled to Cayara to gather evidence of what had occurred. In Ayacucho this Commission met with Col. Rafael Córdova Rivera, Inspector of the Second Infantry Division, and with Prosecutor Escobar Pineda.  It also took statements from a total of 15 witnesses in Cayara. 

                   3.       On May 23, Senator Díez Canseco reported to the Senate on the trip he had made.  The establishment of the commission was approved.         

                   4.       The Commission was installed on May 27. 

                   5.       On May 30, the Commission met to receive testimony from Monsignor Beauzeville, Dr. Raúl Ferrero, President of the Bar Association, and members of the Government Commission that visited Cayara on May 20. 

                   6.       On June 5, the date of the Commission's first trip to Ayacucho and Cayara, a meeting was held with the Political Military Command headed by Gen. Valdivia.  This covered two parts:  an explanation of the military's version of what had occurred in the Cayara area since May 13, and the progress made in the investigation ordered by the Office of the Inspector General of the Army in response to the complaints received.  The next day it went to Erusco and Cayara, but did not interview the witnesses who had made statements to Prosecutor Escobar, Senator Díez Canseco and other congressmen on May 20. 

                   7.       On June 21, the Commission met to speak with the Ministers of Justice and Defense. 

                   8.       On August 21, the Commission made its second trip to Cayara. 

                   9.       The Commission delivered its report on May 9, 1989.   

          II.       A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CAYARA 

                   1.       Geographic and population features 

          1.1     Location 

                   The town of Cayara, the capital of the district of Cayara is located some 140 kms south of the city of Ayacucho, in the province of Víctor Fajardo, at an altitude of 3,164 meters above sea level.  The district includes the outlying areas of Jeshua, Mayupampa, Erusco and Chincheros. 

          1.2     Illiteracy 

                   According to the 1981 Census, the illiteracy rate is high there.  Of a population of 2,216 over the age of 5, 50.49% are illiterate.  This is 2.5 times the national average, which is 20.9%. 

          1.3     Economically-active population 

                   In that census, out of an economically-active population of 579 persons, 87% (504) were engaged in agriculture.  This agricultural EAP is much higher than the average for Ayacucho, which is 69.3%.  We note that Ayacucho is a department of very poor agricultural productivity; though it is third nationwide in terms of economically active population engaged in farming, its agricultural gross domestic product ranks only twelfth among all departments. 

                   Furthermore, 3.4% of the population (20) were engaged in various services, including state bureaucracy, mail, local government, etc.).  Some 1.3% (8) were engaged in commerce.  There is very little in the way of manufacturing, which employs only 0.8% (5 people).  Some 4.9% (26) are engaged in various nonspecific activities. 

                   The unemployed EAP was only 2.76% (16).  However, there are no data for unemployment and this figure is misleading.  Because it is a farm community, farming absorbs a large percentage of the underemployed and unemployed EAP, drawing more manpower than necessary at times when communal or family fields are planted. 

          2.       Electoral features 

                   According to the National Elections Board, in 1985, the total population was 2,595, of whom 667 were voters (between 18 and 70 years of age).  In the most recent general elections, only 488 of the electorate cast votes (73% of the total) and most of the ballots (268) were either void or blank (54.91%).  The PAP received 180 votes (36.88%), the United Left 23 (4.71%), and other political groups only 17 votes (3.48%). 

          3.       The military features of the zone 

                   In the opinion of the military commanders, control of the territory in which Cayara is located has been of great strategic importance in every armed conflict they have experienced throughout history.  "This is still true, which is why the subversive movement attaches such importance to the area." (Testimony given by General Sinesio Jarama to the Accomarca Commission in 1985). 

                   The zone has been described by the Armed Forces as "RED," in other words, an area of heavy senderista activity.  Consequently, the Army has set up countersubversive bases (CSB) in San Pedro Hualla, Colca, Huancapi and Pampa Cangallo.  Following the events in Cayara, a new CSB was set up in the town school.  The command of this zone is the CSB at Pampa Cangallo, which in turn is answerable to the Command Post for National Security Zone No. 5, which until December 31, 1988, was headed up by Peruvian Army Brigadier General José Valdivia Dueñas. 

                   Since the beginning of the counterinsurgency campaign, military forces have been supplanting the civilian authorities -- including the Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor's Office -- and weakening their legal authority.  As a consequence, the provincial prosecutors and magistrates (even high-ranking judges) are encountering serious difficulties in efforts to defend constitutional rights when those rights are transgressed by members of the military or police. 

                   Law 24,150, which regulates military control of zones in a state of emergency, made the Political-Military Command the supreme authority, thereby displacing de jure the civilian authorities.  Moreover, it provides that members of the armed forces will be judged by the military courts if they commit crimes within the zones.  This has meant that many human rights violations that are reported to the judiciary are turned over to military courts where such acts are regarded as functional excesses and not as common crimes and therefore punished, if at all, with small penalties. 

          III.      THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN THE CAYARA REGION SINCE 1980 

                   Since May 1980, the Sendero Luminoso has staged armed attacks in the District of Cayara and in the neighboring districts, which include part of the provinces of Víctor Fajardo, Vilcashuamán and Cangallo.  Further, complaints received by the Office of the Attorney General, congressmen, the Church and nongovernmental human rights organizations, especially since 1983 (the year when the armed forces entered Ayacucho) report serious violations of human and constitutional rights on the part of the armed forces and as part of the counterinsurgency campaign. 

                   On July 29, 1980, in Huancapi, capital of the province of Víctor Fajardo, the Sendero Luminoso dynamited the door of the town hall and left explosive charges at the home of the Deputy Prefect and the Post Office.  This is the first recorded incident.  

                   Months later, in January 1981, Georgina Gambia (a 16‑year old farm girl) was arrested along with her parents at the Vilcashuamán Police Station.  There, she and her mother were raped by six policemen.  Three months later they were released without explanation, and the two would later give birth to children conceived during the assault.  

                   On October 12, 1981, the Government ordered a state of emergency in the provinces of Huamanga, Cangallo, Víctor Fajardo, La Mar and Huanta in the Department of Ayacucho (Supreme Decree 026-81-IN), leaving the zone under the control of the police forces under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior.  Since then the state of emergency has been extended, as has its radius.  

                   On December 24, 1981, according to a press account, a senderista column took over the town of Cayara, destroying the telegraph and local government offices.  

                   On July 14, 1982, the press reported that a column of approximately 25 senderistas had again attacked the town, killing the governor, destroying the post office, the school and summoning together the townspeople for a political harangue.  

                   On October 24, 1982, in Huancapi, police claimed to have discovered a Sendero Luminoso political indoctrination group, arresting 30 people.  Shortly thereafter, the investigations conducted led to the arrest of numerous people in Cayara.  

                   On December 30, 1982, Supreme Decree 068-82-IN was issued, ordering the armed forces to take control of the region, principally the Army and the Navy.  This decree covered the provinces of Huanta, La Mar, Cangallo, Huamanga and Víctor Fajardo (Ayacucho), Andahuaylas (Apurimac) and Angaraes (Huancavelica).  

                   On January 1, 1983, in the community of Parcco (district of Vilicashuamán), army troops seized Marino Castillo Espinosa and Teodosio Castillo Gamboa.  

                   On January 4, 1983, in the town of Llusita (district of Huancapi), military troops from the Cangallo base seized and caused to disappear Lucio Bautista Arcos (22), Pelayo Bautista Esquivel (19), Agustín Bautista Melgar (21), Luis Chumbe Meza (28), Jacinto Meza Quispe (38), Maurelio Meza Quispe (30), Juan Meza Vásquez (29), Rómulo Oré Alegría (40), Santos Quispe Chipana (18), Leoncio Quispe Meza (38) and Marino Vásquez Quispe (23).  

                   In Accomarca, on January 19, 1983, military troops killed a townsperson by the name of Zózimo Teccsi (complaint received by the Accomarca Command).  

                   On January 26, 1983, according to complaints filed by residents, a patrol of "Sinchis" with the Civil Guard entered the District of Huambalpa (Vilcashuamán), killing Macedonio Prado Lizarbe and wounding seven others, among them Prado's 10‑year old son.  They also stole electronic devices, money and livestock.  

                   On February 14, 1983, in Huambalpa, a joint army and police patrol killed Cresenciano Azursa and Lino Pujaico, tortured six others and set fire to three homes and the town hall.  

                   On August 25, 1983, in the District of  Vischongo (Vilcashuamán), combined army and police forces seized Pánfilo Chuchón Prado (35).  Some days later, on August 30, his brother Félix (27) was also taken, this time by army troops.  The two were taken to the Anquipata Headquarters.  Their relatives reported their subsequent disappearance.  

                   On September 2, 1983, in Accomarca, soldiers killed 11 people, including two children:  Félix Pulido Palacios (73), Adriana de la Cruz Pulido (75), José Quispe Pulido (34), Maura Baldeón de Quispe (28), José Quispe Baldeón (2), Janet Quispe Baldeón (4), Apolinaria Huamán de Quispe (21), Carlota Baldeónde Quispe (75), Susana Pulido de Quispe (65), Fausta Sullca Mendoza (33) and Marcial Chávez (25) (a complaint taken by the Accomarca Command).  

                   Between September 2 and 5, 1983, according to press reports, Cayara was the scene of a clash between the army and a column of senderistas.  The armed forces reported one soldier and 40 senderistas dead.  

                   On October 2, 1983, the press reported, military sources said that there had been another clash, this time between a police patrol and a group of senderistas.  Five senderistas were killed.  

                   On October 12, 1983, in Huambalpa, the townspeople filed a complaint to the effect that soldiers disguised as tenant farmers had killed four people.  

                   On November 20, 1983, the press reported that two senderistas disguised as civil guardsmen had attacked a bus and harangued the passengers.  

                   On July 21 or 22, 1984, two tenant farmers were allegedly killed in Cayara by senderistas, according to news reports.  

                   On August 21, 1984, the press reported that senderistas had returned to Cayara and killed 12 tenant farmers.  

                   On October 23, 1984, another 5 tenant farmers were killed in Cayara, presumably by senderistas, according to press accounts.  

                   On December 15, 1984, in Cayara, soldiers from the Hualla base detained a merchant by the name of Lodeciano Crisóstomo Noa and took him to their military unit under arrest.  His relatives would later report his disappearance.  

                   On August 14, 1985, one of the most serious violations of human rights committed by elements of the armed forces during the entire antisubversive campaign occurred in Accomarca.  It was investigated by the Senate and was similar in some ways to the one now under investigation:  

                   Between August 1 and August 7, 1985, there were senderista attacks at Sarhua, Caracha and Putaccasa.  Taking part were "80 subversives armed with light automatic rifles and an undetermined number of submachine guns."  When questioned, the captives confessed that the column was headed for Accomarca, where they had a cache of weapons, stores and ammunitions and where there was a six‑man senderista column called "Accomarca Company."  

                   On August 8, four patrols were sent to Accomarca, Accmay, Chiuinza, CAYARA and Llocllapampa.  Two of these killed 12 people, men and women alike, not in combat but because they were "suspicious" or because they tried to run away when the soldiers approached.  There is no record that any weapons or subversive documents were found on the victims.  After these events, following a plan approved by General Mori Orzo, then Political‑Military Chief of Ayacucho, on August 12 the Lobo, Tigre, Lince 6 and Lince 7 patrols (the last of these under the command of Second Lieutenant Telmo Hurtado Hurtado) set out in the direction of Huancayocc Pass, where Accomarca is located.  

                   Lince 6 and Lince 7 patrols are believed to have worked together.  However, the military account states that Lince 7 was the only one to enter Accomarco on August 14 at 7:00 a.m.  When it saw the townspeople running away, it fired upon them, killing five.  They later captured 25, among them 5 children.  Having decided that "the vast majority (sic) were terrorists," they locked these people up in a house and killed them with gunfire and incendiary grenades.  Witnesses who managed to escape said that in fact 39 adults and 23 children were killed and that three other people disappeared (a summary based on the report of the Senate Investigating Committee, dated October 12, 1985).  

                   The Sendero Luminoso asserts ("Desarrollar la Guerra Popular Sirviendo a la Revolución Mundial" [Conduct the People's War and Thereby Serve the Global Revolution], a clandestine publication put out in 1986) that in August 1985, after the Accomarca massacre, the army opted for a population resettlement strategy in this region, taking advantage of an alleged surrender of tenant farmers who were partisans of the Sendero Luminoso.  At the same time it set up bases in each one of the resettled communities, the priorities being (according to the Sendero Luminoso) San Pedro de Hualla and Accomarca (neighboring districts of Cayara).  The Sendero Luminoso said that it attacked all of them in order to "break the military yoke laid upon the shoulders of the peasantry."  

                   On September 2, 1985, an Official Army Communique (Nº 012‑CCFFAA/RRPP, of September 26, 1985) reported a clash with senderistas near the community of Bellavista, which had left 29 subversives dead and 15 others in flight.  The patrols had set out after them in the direction of the towns of Umaru and Bellavista.  However, some days later, residents of these communities reported to the House of Deputies and the Attorney General of the Nation that on August 27, the army had come in and killed 28 adults and 35 children, hiding their bodies in graves.  A joint Senate and House Investigating Committee was formed and confirmed the existence of sites "where graves had allegedly existed" and of one grave, near Bellavista, containing the bodies of Paulina Quispe (28) and her children, ages 9, 6, 3 and 1; Lucila Quispe (35) and her children, ages 8, 6, 4 and 1-1/2 and Clotilde Janampa (40) and her children, ages 13, 8 and 6.  

                   On January 9, 1986, a senderista column murdered the local Aprista leaders, Mateo Velenzuela and Eulogio Crisóstomo.  

                   On May 4, 1986, army soldiers arrested Teófilo Choccña Sulca (29) in Cayara.  His relatives would later report that he had disappeared.  

                   On May 10, 1986, Genaro Ccayo Noa (34), an employee with the Municipal Council, was detained by army soldiers in Cayara.  His relatives would later report his disappearance.  

                   On August 30, 1986, according to a complaint filed by townspeople from Huambalpa, a patrol made up of Civil Guardsmen and members of the Investigating Police arrested 70 people.  

                   On October 22, 1986, the army reported that it had clashed with subversives in the towns of Parcco and Pomatambo, in Vilcashuamán; 13 subversives had died, among them Claudio Bellido Huaytalla, a senderista leader in the zone known as "Caszelli" (Communique No. 74/CCFFAA, dated October 24, 1986).  However, people from these two communities later filed a complaint to the effect that on that date, in the village of Pomatambo, (Parcco district in Vilcashuamán), a patrol of around 50 soldiers came in and arrested seven people (among them the mayor and community president), and then tortured them and took them away to the town of Parcco.  They arrived there the next day, and there the patrol took another six (including two elderly people 84 years of age, two children 12 and 4 years of age).  These 13 people would eventually be murdered and their bodies burned.  

                   According to the army,* in April 1987 a patrol was ambushed in Cayara, leaving one vehicle destroyed.  

                   In April 1988^* in Mayupampa -- near Cayara -- there was another clash that left six senderistas dead.  

                   On May 6, 1988^* the Sendero Luminoso killed Ing. Tito Alanya Paucarhanca, Secretary General of APRA in Huancasancos and Manager of the Microregion, after attacking and destroying his vehicle.  

                   On May 11, 1988^* the countersubversive base at San Pedro de Hualla came under attack.  The incident left one senderista dead who, according to the army, had been seen several times in Cayara.  

          IV.      THE AMBUSH AT ERUSCO  

                   1.       The army maintains that on the night of May 13, 1988, an army convoy consisting of two UNIMOG trucks left the town of San Pedro de Hualla heading in the direction of Huancapi.  The forward vehicle was under the command of Lt. García Bustamante -- known as "Roble" -- and carried 10 other soldiers; the rear vehicle was under the command of Captain José Miguel Arbulú Sime -- known as "Mosca" -- (32), the convoy commander; with him were eight soldiers.  

                   At approximately 11:30 p.m., after passing through the town of Cayara and at a distance of some 1.5 or 2 kms outside it, in the hamlet known as Erusco, senderista ambushers detonated, via electronic remote control, two dynamite charges that it had buried along the road, and in so doing blew up Captain Arbulú's vehicle.  The army account states that the other vehicle stopped immediately and thus avoided the three dynamite charges that exploded just ahead.  The subversives immediately launched their attack on the convoy.  

                   One second lieutenant and one corporal managed to escape and reached the Huancapi countersubversive base at 1:30 a.m. on the morning of May 14.  From there, the "Tarántula" patrol was immediately sent to Erusco and arrived there at 5:30 in the morning.  

                   During the clash, which the army says lasted four hours, the soldiers were able to make out the voices of men, women and children who -- numbering between 200 and 300 -- demanded their surrender and cheered the armed fighting (report filed by Roble patrol).  However, there were allegedly no more than 10 armed assailants (Gen. Valdivia to the Commission at Los Cabitos, June 6, 1988).  

                   Captain Arbulú died in the attack, as did one sergeant and two corporals (in all 4 members of the military); 4 were seriously wounded, while another 11 were slightly wounded; in all 19 soldiers either died or were wounded.  

                   The subversives got away with 11 light automatic rifles, 8 antitank INSTALAZA grenades, approximately 3000 cartridges and other ammunition.  

                   2.       The civilian population stated that on May 13, it celebrated the festival of the patron of Cayara.  "At around 9:00 p.m., 2 vehicles carrying soldiers came through town, firing shots in the air...."  About 10 minutes later, there was a tremendous explosion and immediately thereafter an exchange of fire that lasted approximately 45 minutes" (sic Victoriana Meza García).  The people were frightened:  "Everyone in the town had come out of their houses and were all excited, saying that it must have been a senderista attack and that now the soldiers would come to take reprisals against the town....  Many people wanted to leave that night...to head for the mountains...for Jeshua...; others wanted to go out to their flocks and areas nearby" (sic Máximo Contreras Monzón). The people were afraid that what had happened in April 1986 would happen again:  "Between the 8th and the 12th there were military actions (in reprisal) against the people of the town...rapes, killings and fires..." (sic Victoriana Meza).  

                   The Commission noted that the testimony on the length of the subversive attack, as reported here, is radically different from the army's version, which said that it lasted approximately 4 hours."  

          V.       THE ACTIONS THAT FOLLOWED THE AMBUSH  

                   1.       GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES  

                   1.1.    The information supplied by the Ministry of Defense has significant gaps and contradictions which we shall duly point out.  Nevertheless, it contains categorical assertions intended to make the complaints appear groundless:  the army states that there was no damage to the homes or to the people and that the people of Cayara took active part in the ambush at Erusco, as well as in a subsequent ambush.  

                   The report of the Office of the Army Inspector stated that on May 14, a patrol was attacked by Cayara residents at the narrow path in Jeshua.  In the encounter, a rifle stolen at Erusco and other munitions were recovered.  The report also states that senderista propaganda was found in Cayara homes, along with explosives; in one of them the remnants of troop uniforms and a military cap were found.  It also states that Cayara residents, when interrogated, said that on May 13, 20 subversives were in Cayara preparing for the attack.  The role played by the people of Cayara would also explain the difference between the number of assailants (more than 100 people) and the number of subversives who were said to be in Cayara preparing for the ambush.  The report also states that a Cayara informant reported the names of people with subversive ties -- supplying a list which we will detail further on -- and the preparations for the ambush.  

                   1.2     The army states that the Military Command for the Emergency Zone (headed by General Valdivia) ordered that 9 patrols be sent, as well as one -- "Tarántula" -- which reportedly left Huancapi as soon as the ambush was reported: 6 patrols from Ayacucho (3 in helicopters and 3 in trucks), 3 patrols from Pampacangallo (2 in trucks and 2 on horseback).  In all 10 patrols allegedly took part in the operation.  The identities of the patrol chiefs have not been provided and the information on the number of soldiers in the patrols is sketchy.  The patrol reports mention that they were mobilized according to a plan called "Persecución."  The description and the extent of that plan have not been made public.  

                   From this version the inference is that the army contends that its response had a twofold purpose:  one purpose was for two patrols ("Tarántula" and "Tigre") to provide immediate backup support, which apparently arrived after the ambush was already over; the other purpose was to track down the subversives, and this was in the hands of "Tigre" patrol, part of "Tarántula" and 7 patrols that arrived later.  

                             The Commission believes that whatever the plan may have been for the military response, the scale of the operation, which would involve the use of all modes of transportation that the armed forces had available in the area and the participation of a considerable number of troops, even from Ayacucho, was such that the person directly responsible would have to have been none other than  General Valdivia Dueñas himself.